Divorce Lawyer in New Delhi,India.Prachi Singh

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About Prachi Singh Advocate.

A-378, Defence Colony, New Delhi-110024

   www.legesjurisassociates.com                                

Advocate Prachi Singh is B.Com and MBA and she is a Family Law Attorney in India. She advising, drafting and contesting the Matters related to Family Laws in Delhi and all others jurisdictions in India, She further advising in NRI Family Law, International Law and Foreign Divorce of her respective clients.

The Child Custody Matters are also includes in her practice area and she advising, drafting and contesting the matters related to Child Custody on behalf of Father, Child Custody on behalf of Mother, Visitation rights on behalf of Father when custody is with mother, child support and maintenance for children,NRI child custody matters and enforcement of foreign child custody matters where child born in abroad and any parent taken the child to India after foreign court order.

She further advising and contesting the matters related to Special Marriage Act Divorce, Mutual Consent Divorce under Special Marriage Act ..etc.

She further advising and contesting the Divorce Matters under Hindu Marriage Act, Annulment of Marriage, Judicial Separation, Marriage Conjugal rights, Divorce by Mutual Consent, Divorce on grounds of cruelty, Divorce on grounds on adultery, Divorce on grounds of fraud and illness..etc..

She further advising on the issue of foreign divorce as where your foreign divorce decree is valid or not, whether your foreign divorce decree is enforceable or not in India,when your foreign divorce decree is valid in India..etc..

She further contesting the matters related to Transfer Petition in Supreme Court of India,Divorce Appeal in High Court,Divorce Appeal in Supreme Court..etc.

Professional Membership With

  • Supreme Court Bar Association
  • Delhi High Court Bar Association
  • Delhi Bar Association
  • Indian National Bar Association
  • Associate Member of American Bar Association International Section.
  • Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA)
  • Associate Member of The Indian Society of International Law
  • International Society of Family Law

Advising on Legal Issues in Family Law Matters:

Divorce Matters under Hindu Marriage Act, Annulment of Marriage, Judicial Separation, Marriage Conjugal rights, Divorce by Mutual Consent, Divorce on grounds of cruelty, Divorce on grounds on adultery, Divorce on grounds of fraud and illness, Transfer Petition in Supreme Court of India,Divorce Appeal in High Court,Divorce Appeal in Supreme Court Divorce under Special Marriage Act, Mutual Consent Divorce under Special Marriage Act, Child Custody Matters, Foreign Child Custody advise and enforceable advise in India,NRI Divorce Issues,Domestic Violence Cases,Visitation Rights of Child..etc.

Court Practice :-

  • Supreme Court of India
  • Delhi High Court
  • Karkardooma District Court,Delhi
  • Tis Hazari District Court,Delhi
  • Saket District Court,South Delhi
  • Dawarka District Court,Delhi
  • New Delhi District Court at Patiala House Court
  • Rohni District Court,New Delhi
  • Debt Recovery Tribunal,Delhi
  • Central Administrative Tribunal,(CAT),New Delhi
  • National State Commission,New Delhi
  • Company Law Board,New Delhi
  • Con summers Forum at Delhi

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Divorce on grounds of Mental & Physical Cruelty under Hindu Marriage Act.

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The expression ‘cruelty’ has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i-a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Cruelty can be physical or mental. In the present case there is no allegation of physical cruelty alleged by the plaintiff. What is alleged is mental cruelty and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. It is settled law that the instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation but to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the plaintiff has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other spouse. In the decision in Samar Ghosh case (supra), this Court set out illustrative cases where inference of ‘mental cruelty’ can be drawn and they are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

The Honourable Supreme Court in Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 73, has held as follows:

6. Treating the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. In the instant case both the trial court as well as the High Court have found on facts that the wife had failed to prove the allegations of cruelty attributed to the respondent. Concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts cannot be disturbed by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Otherwise also the averments made in the petition and the evidence led in support thereof clearly shows that the allegations, even if held to have been proved, would only show the sensitivity of the appellant with respect to the conduct of the respondent which cannot be termed more than ordinary wear and tear of the family life

. In Suman Singh vs. Sanjay Singh, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 85, the Apex Court has held that:

12. The word “cruelty” used in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act is not defined under the Act. However, this expression was the subject matter of interpretation in several cases of this Court. What amounts to “mental cruelty” was succinctly explained by this Court (three Judge Bench) in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh [(2007) 4 SCC 511]. Their Lordships speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari observed that no uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet it is appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behavior which may be considered relevant in dealing with the cases of “mental cruelty”. Their Lordships then broadly enumerated 16 category of cases which are considered relevant while examining the question as to whether the facts alleged and proved constitute “mental cruelty” so as to attract the provisions of Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Act for granting decree of divorce.

 

 

In the matter of Darshan Gupta vs. Radhika Gupta, (2013) 9 SCC 149. Towards the same end, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced yet another submission. The learned counsel representing the appellant sought dissolution of marriage on the ground that the matrimonial ties between the parties had irretrievably broken down. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that this Court would be justified in annulling the marriage between the parties, especially when the parties have lived apart for more than 12 years. Inviting this Courts attention to the intervention at the instance of this Court, in compliance wherewith the parties had made a last-ditch effort to live together, and had actually taken up residence in an independent flat in Hyderabad on 29-9-2011, it was pointed out that they could not persuade themselves into a relationship of cordiality. It was, therefore, sought to be suggested that there was no likelihood of the parties ever living together as husband and wife. It was accordingly submitted that this Court should consider the annulment of the matrimonial ties between the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

At the present juncture, it is questionable as to whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, wherein this Court has held as under:

10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.

If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.

There has been a lot of brainstorming with regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.

In the matter of Sangeetha Vs Jitender Bhandari, The Hon’ble Madras High Court held that” Coming to the point raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband that there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the same cannot be invoked in this case, as one of the parties, viz. the appellant/wife is interested in living with the respondent/husband, which is quite evident from the fact that she did not even think of filing a petition claiming monthly maintenance from her husband. That apart, irretrievable breakdown of marriage has not been incorporated as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.”

 

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.SUDHAKAR

and

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.VAIDYANATHAN

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos.168 and 169 of 2012

Sangeetha                                                                                                                                   … Appellant in both appeals

VS

Jitendra Bhandari                                                                                                                      … Respondent in both appeals Civil Miscellaneous Appeals filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, against the common judgment and decree dated 25.11.2011 made in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai.                                     For Appellant in both appeals       :  Mrs.K.Santhakumari…                                                                                For Respondent in both appeals :  Mr.V.T.Gopalan, Senior Counsel                                                                                                               for Mr.P.Krisna

J U D G M E N T

S.VAIDYANATHAN,J.

Aggrieved by the order of dissolution of marriage dated 25.11.2011 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011, the appellant/wife has come up with the above appeals.

2.Since the issue involved in both the cases is one and the same, the appeals are taken up for disposal by a common judgment.

3.Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The marriage between the respondent/husband and the appellant/wife was solemnized on 28.06.1998 at Vijayashree Mahal, Anna Nagar, Chennai, as per customary rites. They both belong to orthodox Jain community. From the wedlock, they have two male children. The respondent/husband is running a shop dealing with Electrical accessories and the appellant is a house-wife. The respondent/husband initially filed a petition in O.P.No.1942 of 2008 seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. Thereafter, the appellant/wife filed a petition in O.P.No.218 of 2011 praying for restitution of conjugal rights, which got dismissed. The Principal Family Court, Chennai took up both these petitions together and passed a common order dissolving the marriage on the ground of cruelty in favour of the husband. The aggrieved wife is before this Court now.

4.Before proceeding to analyze the correctness of the order of dissolution of marriage, for better appreciation of the case, contentions of both the husband and wife in their respective petitions, need to be looked into.

5.In the petition filed by the respondent/husband on 30.04.2008 for dissolution of the marriage, it was inter alia, stated as follows:

(a) After marriage, the appellant/wife often went to her parent’s house and used to compel the respondent/husband to come out of his joint family. She is in the habit of troubling the respondent/husband to lend money to her parents and her relatives. Also, she used to threaten the respondent/husband that she will commit suicide and her attempt to commit suicide was thwarted by the respondent/husband more than once.

(b)On 05.11.2005, the appellant/wife demanded money from the respondent/husband and he in turn told her that he had already lent enough money to her parents and that he cannot give any money further to her family. Again on 06.11.2005, she asked for money from her husband, while he was in an angry mood. Immediately, the respondent/husband started for going out. While he reached the ground floor, where his driver was also standing, they saw the appellant/wife attempting to jump from their balcony, which is in the 2nd floor of the Apartment. Though the respondent/husband shouted at her not to jump, she jumped off the 2nd floor. Immediately, he took her to First Med Apollo Hospital and admitted her. The appellant/wife underwent treatment there and thereafter, the respondent/husband shifted her to Main Apollo Hospital and one Dr.Sajan Heggede told the respondent/husband that the appellant/wife had a fracture in the Spinal Cord. On 08.11.2005, the appellant/wife underwent operation on her Spinal Cord and was shifted to I.C.U. While so, police came for enquiry and the appellant/wife gave a statement that her gold bangle slipped and in an attempt to catch hold of the same, she slipped and fell from the 2nd floor.

(c)Thereafter, when the appellant/wife was admitted in Vellore Hospital, neither her parents nor her relatives took care of her and it is only the respondent/husband who looked after her in the hospital and their two children, who were studying in school. Even after such incident, the appellant/wife never used to speak with the respondent/husband smoothly. Thereafter, at the behest of the appellant/wife, she was shifted from Vellore Hospital to her parent’s house and she was in the custody of her parents and their children were in the custody of the respondent/husband.

(d)According to the respondent/husband, differences arose between him and the appellant/wife right from the day of marriage. Moreover, she has sustained spinal cord and pelvic fracture and is in a vegetative state. The appellant/wife is in the habit of giving trouble to the respondent/husband by threatening him that she will commit suicide. As there is no possibility of reconciliation between them, the respondent/husband wanted to dissolve the marriage and filed a petition in O.P.No.1942 of 2008 seeking dissolution of marriage.

6.Denying the averments made in the petition for divorce, the appellant/wife filed a counter affidavit stating that there was no question of demanding any money by the appellant/wife and her parents from the respondent/husband, as the parents of the appellant/wife are themselves in a good and sound financial status. Further, it is her contention that the respondent/husband has not even discharged his marital obligations of taking care of the appellant/wife at the time of crisis and expending money on her ailment. She has further stated that on account of her fall and spinal injury, she is definitely not in a position to attend to her regular chores. This will certainly not entitle the respondent/husband to seek dissolution of marriage and that the injuries suffered by her on account of the fall is only for a short period and she is ready and willing to come back to her marital duties within a reasonable time.

7.The case was taken up for trial. The respondent/husband was examined as P.W.1; the appellant/wife was examined as P.W.2; one Pranav, the elder son of the appellant and the respondent, was examined as C.W.1 and one Gaurav, the nephew of the respondent/husband, was examined as C.W.2. On behalf of the respondent/husband, five Exhibits were marked, details of which are as follows:

Ex.P1 Legal Notice dated 20.04.2008 issued by the petitioner’s counsel to the respondent Ex.P2 Medical Reports (Series), dated 17.11.2005 Ex.P3 Marriage Certificate, dated 03.09.2002 Ex.P4 Marriage Photo Ex.P5 Copy of Petition in O.P.No.218/2011 On behalf of the appellant/wife, no document was marked. The parties were cross-examined. The respondent/husband was cross-examined on 15.02.2010. In the cross-examination, he reiterated the statements made in his affidavit for divorce.

8.On 18.01.2011, the appellant/wife filed a petition in O.P.No.218 of 2011, wherein, it is stated as follows:

(a)The marriage between the appellant/wife and the respondent/husband was solemnized on 28.06.1998 and initially everything went on smoothly, but after sometime, the respondent started showing his anger towards the appellant. He is a very short-tempered person and whenever he is angry, he has no decency of words and language he uses. The worst thing is that even if he cools down, he never feels sorry for his words and deeds. Whenever the appellant/wife asked him as to why he is behaving in such a manner, he would say that his character is so and it is for her to adjust accordingly. The appellant/wife did try to adjust during her entire matrimonial life. She tried to mend his words, but he refused to listen to any of her requests.

(b)During the year 2003, after the birth of the second child, the appellant/wife’s brother Deepak opened a Sports Centre in Vepery. At that point of time, the respondent/husband had volunteered Rs.10,000/- for its renovation, but later on, started abusing the appellant’s brother for not returning the money. In November 2005, during Deepawali, he called the appellant’s brother and shouted at him for non-payment of money. The appellant’s brother immediately handed over money to his sister, which again kindled anger in the respondent. The appellant could not bear the abusive language uttered by the respondent against her family members. When the appellant’s brother came to know that the respondent expected him to come personally to hand over the money, he immediately met him and said sorry to the respondent/husband. He tried to convince him that he had no such intention to hurt him and make him angry. After her brother left, the respondent/husband shouted at her in anger and took his things to go to Kilpuak. The couple stayed at Vepery for a short time.

(c)On 05.11.2005, the appellant/wife was waiting for the respondent/husband to come home, till midnight. The next day morning, when he came home, he saw the appellant/wife waiting for him in the balcony. While so, she was holding her bangles in her hand. When the bangles fell down, in order to catch hold of them, she bent herself and in that process, she fell down from the balcony. The driver who was standing in the ground floor caught hold of her upper body, but the lower part of her body was hit hard on the floor. Then, she was taken to First Medical Hospital for treatment. The Doctors informed her that her lower spinal cord was injured seriously and she had a pelvis fracture. She underwent surgery on 08.11.2005. The respondent/husband was helpful to her at that time. The Police took statement about the incident. Later, she took one month bed rest at Kilpauk and was later readmitted in Apollo Hospital for five days.

(d)When the appellant wanted to meet her parents, the respondent took her to her parental home. He also took her to CMC Rehabilitation Centre for physiotherapy treatment. The appellant stayed there for three months and learnt to walk on Calipers with crutches. During that time, misunderstanding arose between the family members of the appellant and the respondent. When she was discharged from CMC, the respondent gave an ultimatum to her that if she wanted to live with him, she should sever her ties with her family members. The appellant/wife had no other choice but to accept it. After taking the appellant to home, the respondent took good care of her. But, slowly he started getting irritated for no reason and started shouting at the appellant. She was permitted to stay in the second floor, but the kitchen was in the ground floor. She was unable to cook or help her mother-in-law in the kitchen, but tried her level best to do household work.

(e)The appellant/wife had to drag herself from the second floor to the ground floor of the house to do the work, due to which she developed bedsore. Slowly, she started washing clothes, dusting bed sheets and cleaning toilets. At the initial stage itself, she requested to appoint a maidservant to take care of her, but the respondent failed to do so, for reasons best known to him. When she was suffering from severe fever, instead of taking her to the hospital, he called a physician and asked her to undergo treatment under him. Day by day, the respondent developed hatred towards the appellant and mentally tortured her for petty reasons and kept cursing the appellant’s parents. He abused the appellant’s mother and sister in vulgar language.

(f)In July 2007, when the appellant’s health condition worsened, the respondent, instead of taking care of her, went out of station without informing the appellant. Hence, the appellant took permission of her mother-in-law to go to her parental home and called her mother and brother-in-law to take her for treatment. When the respondent came to know of the appellant’s stay at her parental home, he got wild and told her that since she had gone out of the matrimonial home without his permission, he will not allow her to come back to her marital home. Further, he demanded divorce from the appellant and all her efforts to convince him went in vain.

(g)Due to regular treatment and care with love and affection at her parental home, bedsore and other problems got healed and she was able to move around the house with the help of a wheel chair and do her duties. Though the appellant’s relatives and well-wishers tried to patch up things between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent was reluctant to join her. The respondent/husband started spreading false stories that the appellant’s parents were demanding money from him. According to the appellant/wife, when her parents had given Rs.5,00,000/- as dowry besides gold, silver and other household articles at the time of her marriage with the respondent, he wantonly belittled the appellant and her family members by saying that they are after his money.

(h)According to the appellant/wife, her condition is better and she is capable of leading matrimonial life. Though she wanted to join her husband, because of the divorce petition filed by her husband, she could not do so. Even now, the respondent/husband insists that she should give her consent for divorce, so that their children will live peacefully. He wanted to have a second marriage and lead a peaceful life with another woman. Though the appellant/wife needs financial support from her husband for her treatment, she has not claimed the same in the interest of joining her husband.

9.The Principal Family Court, Chennai, by a common order dated 25.11.2011 in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011, granted divorce to the appellant/wife. Relevant portion of the said order would read thus:

25.Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling of one of the spouse due to the behavioural pattern by the other spouse. The major suicidal attempt on 06.11.2005, if viewed on the basis of record as well as on evidence, there is no alternative but to conclude that the respondent caused mental cruelty to her husband by her conduct.

26.In the instant case, mental cruelty is the conduct of the respondent which caused mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the petitioner. Therefore, the apprehension on the part of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent wife cannot be termed as ordinary wear and tear of married life. It is extremely difficult for any person to live with his wife who had the tendency to commit suicide often.

33.The petitioner used to attend the court for few hearings in a old rusted wheel chair assisted by her father and a servant maid. At the request of the court, petitioner husband bought a new wheel chair and offered it to the respondent wife and the respondent wife was also kind enough to accept the offer. In this aspect of the matter, it is relevant to refer para 19 of the written submission filed on behalf of the petitioner husband. The submission of facts raised in para 19 is denied by the respondent wife. After filing of the written submission, when court posed a question to the petitioner as to whether he can pay Rs.10,000/- p.m. to his wife as maintenance even though no petition has been filed by the wife for maintenance. The petitioner offered to pay Rs.5,000/-p.m. as maintenance. This was happened subsequent to the filing of written submission of both the parties. The respondent wife is a physically challenged person. Having considered her position, the petitioner is directed to comply with the assurance given to the court in respect of future maintenance admitted by him.

34.In view of the above analysis and evaluation of incidents on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record as well as on the basis of the law laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no option open to the Court but to conclude that any rigid view to keep the marriage between the parties indissoluble in the name of stability would not serve any purpose of the marriage in the facts situation of the instance case. The consequences of preserving the unworkable marriage would put the parties into greater misery than separation. Hence, I am constrained to grant divorce on the ground of cruelty in favour of the petitioner.

35…. In the result, the petition in F.C.O.P.No.1942/2008 is allowed as prayed for by granting an order of divorce on the ground of cruelty and thereby the marriage held on 28.06.1998 between the petitioner and respondent is hereby dissolved.

10.Mrs.K.Santhakumari, learned counsel for the appellant/wife would contend that the finding of the Family Court against the appellant/wife in respect of the incident on 06.11.2005 is wholly unsustainable in view of the statement of C.W.1, the child of the parties to the effect that his mother, in her attempt to catch hold of the gold bangle that slipped off her hand, fell down accidentally from the balcony. Also, she would strenuously contend that the Family Court ought to have seen that the respondent/husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage with a clear intention to get rid of the appellant/wife, who has been physically affected and to get remarried, even according to the admissions in his own evidence. According to her, the appellant/wife is always willing to live with her husband and she never even filed a petition seeking interim maintenance.

11.In support of her case, learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions:

(i)Subhash Chander Sharma vs. Anjali Sharma, II (2010) DMC 831 24. However it is a catch situation as this ground can ease the way for many who are under the burden of a doomed relationship to a breather but at the same time it may give an opportunity to the ones trying to maneuver the alleys of law for their self conceited motives.

  1. There has been a lot of brainstorming with regard to the efficacy and societal impact that this ground would have if it is made as a ground for divorce. On the recommendations of the Law Commission of India, the Legislature in its wisdom would amend the Hindu Marriage Act to bring within its fold the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. However it is expected that watertight safeguards are introduced so as not to send the message that now divorce has become a cakewalk.
  2. Henceforth, there are some key areas that need to be pondered upon. The ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage cannot be resorted to as a strait jacket formula leading to the institution of marriage becoming so fragile that the wrong doer abuses it for his selfish ends leaving the other party in lurch. But it is only when the court is satisfied that the marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage and there is no chance of their coming together should the court open the deadlock of wedlock.

(ii) Neelam Kumar vs. Dayarani, II (2010) DMC 198 (SC) 13.We are not impressed by this submission at all. There is nothing to indicate that the respondent has contributed in anyway to the alleged breakdown of the marriage. If a party to a marriage, by his own conduct brings the relationship to a point of irretrievable breakdown, he/she cannot be allowed to seek divorce on the ground of breakdown of the marriage. That would simply mean giving someone the benefits of his/her own misdeeds. Moreover, in a later decision of this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, II (2008) DMC 167 (SC) = VI (2008) SLT 289 = (2009) 6 SCC 379, it has been held that irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce as it is not contemplated under Section 13 and granting divorce on this ground alone would amount to adding a clause therein by a judicial verdict which would amount to legislation by Court. In the concluding paragraph of this judgment, the Court observed:

If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the Legislature and not by the Court. It is for the Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the Courts.

(iii) Gourab Datta vs. Smt. Arundhuti Majumder (Datta), AIR 2011 Gauhati 183 24.As provided by Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a petitioner, seeking divorce is required to prove the existence of the grounds, provided in the said Section. In the present case, the only ground taken by the appellant was cruelty which is a ground seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Here, the term petitioner indicates either the husband or the wife, as the case may be. A petitioner, in order to get a decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty, is required to prove that he or she has been treated with cruelty by the other side. As discussed above, there is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellant i.e. the husband was treated with cruelty by the respondent.

Therefore, on careful perusal of the entire evidence on record and in the light of the decisions cited above, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant-husband failed to establish that he was treated with cruelty by the respondent-wife. Therefore, the appellant failed to substantiate the ground, taken by him, for seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage. In view of the above, we find no difficulty in holding that the learned trial Judge committed no error by refusing to grant the prayer for divorce. Therefore, we find no merit in this appeal requiring interference with the impugned judgment and order.

(iv) Jayashree vs. S.Suresh, (2012) III DMC 465 (DB) 27.The other contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, is that the petitioner is not entitled to get a decree in his favour in view of Section 23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Section 23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act stipulates that if the Court is satisfied that where the ground of divorce petition is cruelty, the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, the Court shall decree such relief accordingly. In the present case, in paragraph No.12 of the petition, the petitioner has averred that he never took drastic steps of initiating proceedings to dissolve the marriage because he was interested in the welfare of his children and lived with the respondent for more than 10 years. It is also averred in paragraph No.5 of the petition, that the respondent used to leave the matrimonial home often and the petitioner would bring her back and live with her till she finally left the matrimonial home on 18.5.2004. Even if the allegations of cruelty mentioned in the petition, are taken as true for the sake of argument, the petitioner has condoned the cruelty by his acts in bringing her back to the matrimonial home and living with her. In fact, the respondent left the matrimonial home on 18.5.2004, and the petition seeking for divorce, has been filed in the month of July 2004. Hence as rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the petitioner is not entitled to get a decree in his favour in view of Section 23(1)(b) of Hindu Marriage Act.

(v) Darshan Gupta vs. Radhika Gupta, (2013) 9 SCC 1 49. Towards the same end, the learned counsel for the appellant advanced yet another submission. The learned counsel representing the appellant sought dissolution of marriage on the ground that the matrimonial ties between the parties had irretrievably broken down. It was, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that this Court would be justified in annulling the marriage between the parties, especially when the parties have lived apart for more than 12 years. Inviting this Courts attention to the intervention at the instance of this Court, in compliance wherewith the parties had made a last-ditch effort to live together, and had actually taken up residence in an independent flat in Hyderabad on 29-9-2011, it was pointed out that they could not persuade themselves into a relationship of cordiality. It was, therefore, sought to be suggested that there was no likelihood of the parties ever living together as husband and wife. It was accordingly submitted that this Court should consider the annulment of the matrimonial ties between the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

  1. At the present juncture, it is questionable as to whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, wherein this Court has held as under:
  2. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.
  3. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that this Court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. In our opinion, those cases have not taken into consideration the legal position which we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents. A mere direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent.
  4. If we grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, then we shall by judicial verdict be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act to the effect that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is also a ground for divorce. In our opinion, this can only be done by the legislature and not by the Court. It is for Parliament to enact or amend the law and not for the courts. Hence, we do not find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.
  5. Had both the parties been willing we could, of course, have granted a divorce by mutual consent as contemplated by Section 13-B of the Act, but in this case the respondent is not willing to agree to a divorce.
  6. Since we were not agreeable with the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the plea of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the learned counsel sought the same relief, for the same reasons, by imploring us to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and to annul the marriage between the parties, as a matter of doing complete justice between the parties. Doing justice between the parties is clearly a constitutional obligation. This Court has been bestowed with the discretion to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it . The concept of justice, however, varies depending on the interest of the party. On most occasions, it is advisable to adjudicate matters in consonance with law. Whenever it is possible to do so on the touchstone of the Courts conscience, the determination rendered would simultaneously result in doing justice between the parties. All the same, since we have been called upon to annul the marriage between Darshan Gupta and his wife Radhika Gupta in order to do complete justice to the parties, we have ventured to thoughtfully examine the matter from the instant perspective as well.
  7. In the context of doing justice it was suggested, that the appellant would be ready and willing to pay the respondent, whatever was considered appropriate by this Court. We are informed, that the appellant is financially well-to-do. We shall, therefore, keep in our mind the appellants offer while examining the instant issue. We would, in our endeavour to determine the issue in hand, examine the matter by reversing the roles of the parties. We will examine the matter as if the wife had approached the Family Court seeking divorce on the ground that her husband had suffered brain damage leading to cognitive deficiencies. Yet, despite the said deficiencies, his working memory had returned to near normal after treatment. And his mental condition was such that it would not have any effect on his matrimonial obligations. And the wifes family is agreeable to pay an amount to be determined by this Court (just as the husband Darshan Gupta has offered), so as to enable their daughter to break away, and find a more suitable match. Should she have been granted freedom from her matrimonial ties, in the given facts, in order to do complete justice to the parties? We would ask ourselves, whether the husband would have accepted such a plea, in the facts denoted above? In such situation, if this Court had, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, granted compensation to the husband, and had dissolved his marriage on the pretext of doing complete justice between the parties, would the same be acceptable to the husband? We have no doubt in our mind, that on a reversal of roles, the husband, without any fault of his own, would have never accepted as just the dissolution of his matrimonial ties, even if the couple had been separated for a duration as is the case in hand. Especially, if the husband had, right from the beginning, fervently expressed the desire to restore his matrimonial relationship with his wife and to live a normal life with her.

12.Per contra, Mr.V.T.Gopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent/husband would contend that the appellant/wife caused mental torture to the respondent/wife by often threatening him that she will commit suicide, thereby disturbing the harmony in the family. He would fairly submit that the respondent/husband has provided all facilities to the appellant/wife from the date of the injury till she left for her maternal home. It is his further contention that the appellant/wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights only in the year 2011 and it is an afterthought. It clearly shows that she never had the intention to live with the respondent/husband and only in order to extort money and to defeat the divorce petition filed on account of cruelty, she has filed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that the order of divorce granted by the Family Court has to be confirmed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

13.To substantiate his stand that the appellant/wife has caused cruelty to the respondent/husband, learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following decisions:

(i) a decision of this Court in the case of Sumitran Rober vs. Sophia, 2001 (3) LW 649, 14.Arguing on the standard of proof of adultery in matrimonial cases, the learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that the standard of proof required in a criminal case cannot be applied for the proceedings in matrimonial cases and the petitioner who alleged adultery is only required to prove the allegations by preponderance of probability. It cannot be disputed that the allegations as to the adultery have to be proved by preponderance of probability. But it has to be necessarily stated that it is well established that the petition for divorce on the charges of adultery should not be allowed merely on suspicion and doubts expressed by the party approaching the court. As stated above, the petitioner has clearly averred in paragraph 11 of the petition that he became suspicious of the conduct of the respondent. In the instant case, the averments made in the petition and the evidence adduced are not sufficient to hold that the respondent has committed adultery. On the contrary the available evidence would throw suspicion and doubt over the petitioner’s case whether an incident could have taken place on 29.04.1997 as urged by the petitioner’s side. Thus on both grounds for not impleading the adulterer as co-respondent and on the ground of not proving the adulterous conduct of the respondent, the petition has to necessarily fail. The respondent has categorically admitted that at no point of time, the petitioner deserted herself. Under such circumstances, the request of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights in the counter claim cannot be considered. The above issues are answered accordingly.

(ii) Geeta Jagadish Mangtani vs. Jagdish Mangtani, 2005 (8) SCC 177 5. We are of the view that these observations of the High Court are fully justified in the facts of the present case. One has to particularly note the fact that the parties knew even prior to marriage whatever they were earning. The earnings of the wife from a government job before the marriage was more than double of that of the husband. With the knowledge of this fact the parties entered into matrimonial alliance. The marriage survived only for a brief period of about seven months. After 2-6-1993 till the exchange of notices and replies during September to December 1996 and filing of the divorce petition ultimately by the husband on 31-12-1996, there has been no attempt on the part of the wife to stay with the husband. She is a school teacher and it is common knowledge that in schools there are long vacations during summer months, more so, in government schools where the wife teaches. At least during those holidays she could have visited the husband at Ulhasnagar along with her son and stayed with him. There is nothing on record to show that any such attempt was ever made by her to visit the husband during this entire period. She has stated in her evidence that the husband used to come and stay with her during her vacations. This has been denied by the husband. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable, that there was never any attempt on the part of the wife to go to her husbands house i.e. matrimonial home of the parties after she left on 2-6-1993. From this fact alone animus deserendi on the part of the wife is clearly established. She has chosen to adopt a course of conduct which proves desertion on her part. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that this desertion on the part of the wife was with a reasonable cause. Such a course of conduct over a long period indicates total abandonment of marriage and cannot be justified on the ground of monetary consideration alone as a reasonable cause to desert. It also amounts to wilful neglect of the husband by the wife. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the High Court appears to be absolutely correct in the facts and circumstances of the case. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

(iii) Naveen Kholi vs. Nellu Kohli, 2006 (4) SCC 558 86. In view of the fact that the parties have been living separately for more than 10 years and a very large number of aforementioned criminal and civil proceedings have been initiated by the respondent against the appellant and some proceedings have been initiated by the appellant against the respondent, the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the parties is only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.

  1. Before we part with this case, on consideration of the totality of facts, this Court would like to recommend the Union of India to seriously consider bringing an amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for the grant of divorce. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps.

(iv) Mayadevi vs. Jagdish Prasad, 2007 (3) SCC 136 8. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submitted that the instances highlighted by the trial court and analysed in great detail by the High Court clearly made out a case for dowry (sic cruelty) and no interference is called for in this appeal.

  1. 10. The expression cruelty has not been defined in the Act. Cruelty can be physical or mental. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. The question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status, environment in which they live. Cruelty, as noted above, includes mental cruelty, which falls within the purview of a matrimonial wrong. Cruelty need not be physical. If from the conduct of the spouse same is established and/or an inference can be legitimately drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse, about his or her mental welfare then this conduct amounts to cruelty. In a delicate human relationship like matrimony, one has to see the probabilities of the case. The concept, proof beyond the shadow of doubt, is to be applied to criminal trials and not to civil matters and certainly not to matters of such delicate personal relationship as those of husband and wife. Therefore, one has to see what are the probabilities in a case and legal cruelty has to be found out, not merely as a matter of fact, but as the effect on the mind of the complainant spouse because of the acts or omissions of the other. Cruelty may be physical or corporeal or may be mental. In physical cruelty, there can be tangible and direct evidence, but in the case of mental cruelty there may not at the same time be direct evidence. In cases where there is no direct evidence, courts are required to probe into the mental process and mental effect of incidents that are brought out in evidence. It is in this view that one has to consider the evidence in matrimonial disputes.
  2. The expression cruelty has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course or conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. (See Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi.)
  3. To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty so as to come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than ordinary wear and tear of married life. The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the type as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the relationship between the parties had deteriorated to such an extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may well constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other party.
  4. The court dealing with the petition for divorce on the ground of cruelty has to bear in mind that the problems before it are those of human beings and the psychological changes in a spouses conduct have to be borne in mind before disposing of the petition for divorce. However insignificant or trifling, such conduct may cause pain in the mind of another. But before the conduct can be called cruelty, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. It is for the court to weigh the gravity. It has to be seen whether the conduct was such that no reasonable person would tolerate it. It has to be considered whether the complainant should be called upon to endure as a part of normal human life. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.
  5. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance to each others fault to a certain bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles, trifling differences should not be exaggerated and magnified to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. All quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case and as noted above, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A too technical and hypersensitive approach would be counterproductive to the institution of marriage. The courts do not have to deal with ideal husbands and ideal wives. It has to deal with a particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a mere ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to matrimonial court.

(v) Rishikesh Sharma vs. Saroj Sharma, 2007 (2) SCC 263 4. We heard Mr A.K. Chitale, learned Senior Counsel and Mr S.S. Dahiya, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the judgment passed by both the trial court and also of the High Court. It is not in dispute that the respondent is living separately from the year 1981. Though the finding has been rendered by the High Court that the wife last resided with her husband up to 25-3-1989, the said finding according to the learned counsel for the appellant is not correct. In view of the several litigations between the parties it is not possible for her to prosecute criminal case against the husband and at the same time continue to reside with her husband. In the instant case the marriage is irretrievably broken down with no possibility of the parties living together again. Both the parties have crossed 49 years and living separately and working independently since 1981. There being a history of litigation with the respondent wife repeatedly filing criminal cases against the appellant which could not be substantiated as found by the courts. This apart, only child born in the wedlock in 1975 has already been given in marriage. Under such circumstances the High Court was not justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of the appellant. This apart, the wife also has made certain allegations against her husband, that the husband has already remarried and is living with another lady as stated by her in the written statement. The High Court also has not considered the allegations made by the respondent which have been repeatedly made and repeatedly found baseless by the courts.

  1. In our opinion it will not be possible for the parties to live together and therefore there is no purpose in compelling both the parties to live together. Therefore, the best course in our opinion is to dissolve the marriage by passing a decree of divorce so that the parties who are litigating since 1981 and have lost valuable part of life can live peacefully for remaining part of their life.
  2. During the last hearing both the husband and wife were present in the Court. The husband was ready and willing to pay a lump sum amount by way of permanent alimony to the wife. The wife was not willing to accept the lump sum amount but however expressed her willingness to live with her husband. We are of the opinion that her desire to live with her husband at this stage and at this distance of time is not genuine. Therefore, we are not accepting this suggestion made by the wife and reject the same.

(vi) S.Latha Kunjamma vs. Anil Kumar, 2008 (11) KLJ 49 7. False, defamatory, scandalous, malicious, baseless and unproved allegations made against the spouse in the written statement may amount to cruelty. The irresponsible insinuation and allegations which were made during the course of litigation against the wife cannot be brushed aside. Such a view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the decision reported in Parihar v. Parihar . Pushparani v. Krishan Lal is a case where the wife had in her written statement alleged that an illicit relationship existed between her husband and one Smt. Bindra Devi. When the husband appeared in the witness box the said statement was directly suggested to him in the cross-examination. This imputation was not ground pleaded in the petition by the husband it was held by the Delhi High Court that the allegations of adultery made by the wife in the written statement and at the time of cross-examination could be taken into consideration for granting a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. The learned Judge had followed the principle that cruelty subsequent to the institution of the petition could be taken into account to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.

  1. No doubt, the burden must lie on the petitioner to establish her case. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a higher standard proof in trials involving enquiry into issues of criminal nature. The ground of desertion upon which the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed does not require that the petitioner must prove her case beyond all reasonable doubt in matrimonial proceedings. The court below was therefore in error in holding that the proof adduced by the petitioner as PW1 is not sufficient proof for supporting the ground of desertion. The standard of proof required in matrimonial cases under the Act is not to establish the grounds alleged beyond reasonable doubt but merely one to find out whether the preponderance is in favour of the existence of the said fact alleged.

(vii)Ravikumar vs. Julmidevi, 2010 (4) SCC 476 19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it may be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty.

(viii) Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple @ Kajal, 2011 (12) SCC 1 3. After the marriage, the appellant husband found that the respondent wife was acting in a very abnormal manner, as she used to abruptly get very aggressive, hostile and suspicious in nature. In a fit of anger, she used to give threats that she would bring an end to her life by committing suicide and involve the appellant husband and his family members in a criminal case, unless she was provided a separate residence. On one occasion, she attempted to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace but was saved because of timely intervention of the appellant husband.

  1. It is well settled that giving repeated threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty. When such a thing is repeated in the form of sign or gesture, no spouse can live peacefully. In the case on hand, the appellant husband has placed adequate materials to show that the respondent wife used to give repeated threats to commit suicide and once even tried to commit suicide by jumping from the terrace. Cruelty postulates a treatment of a spouse with such cruelty as to create reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the other party. The acts of the respondent wife are of such quality or magnitude and consequence as to cause pain, agony and suffering to the appellant husband which amounted to cruelty in matrimonial law.

(ix) K.Srinivasa Rao vs. D.A.Deepa, 2013 (5) SCC 226 34. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent wife has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellant husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. In this Court the respondent wife expressed that she wants to go back to the appellant husband, but, that is not possible now. The appellant husband is not willing to take her back. Even if we refuse decree of divorce to the appellant husband, there are hardly any chances of the respondent wife leading a happy life with the appellant husband because a lot of bitterness is created by the conduct of the respondent wife.

  1. In Vijaykumar (2003 (6) SCC 334), it was submitted that if the decree of divorce is set aside, there may be fresh avenues and scope for reconciliation between parties. This Court observed that judged in the background of all surrounding circumstances, the claim appeared to be too desolate, merely born out of despair rather than based upon any real, concrete or genuine purpose or aim. In the facts of this case we feel the same.
  2. While we are of the opinion that decree of divorce must be granted, we are alive to the plight of the respondent wife. The appellant husband is working as an Assistant Registrar in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. He is getting a good salary. The respondent wife fought the litigation for more than 10 years. She appears to be entirely dependent on her parents and on her brother, therefore, her future must be secured by directing the appellant husband to give her permanent alimony. In the facts and circumstance of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant husband should be directed to pay a sum of Rs 15,00,000 (Rupees fifteen lakhs only) to the respondent wife as and by way of permanent alimony.

14.We have heard the learned counsel on either side, gave careful consideration to their submissions, perused the decisions relied on by them and the material documents available on record.

15.The issue before us is whether the Court below is right in granting the decree of divorce against the appellant/wife on the ground of cruelty. Though, according to the respondent/husband, the appellant/wife sustained injuries on 06.11.2005 only as a result of an attempt to commit suicide, the version of the appellant/wife is that she fell down accidentally from the second floor balcony in an attempt to catch hold of the gold bangle that slipped from her hand. Admittedly, the appellant/wife suffered fracture in her spinal cord and pelvis and is now moving around only in a wheel-chair. Though the Family Court has come to a conclusion that only being frustrated at the respondent’s refusal to lend money to her parents, the appellant/wife indulged in suicidal attempt by jumping from the balcony of the second floor, whether the injuries sustained by her on 06.11.2005 is due to the intentional jump or the accidental fall from the balcony of the 2nd floor of her house, can be decided only by fair appreciation of evidence. Any prudent person will doubt the reason assigned by the respondent/husband for the suicide attempt of the appellant/wife.

 

16.It is seen that when the appellant/wife sustained injuries on 06.11.2005, she was immediately taken to hospital by her husband, wherein, the Doctors have reported that the appellant/wife sustained fracture on her spinal cord and pelvis. On 08.11.2005, the appellant/wife underwent operation on her Spinal Cord and shifted to I.C.U. It has to be noted that when the police came for enquiry, the appellant/wife gave a statement that her gold bangle slipped from her hand and in an attempt to catch hold of the same, she slipped and fell from the 2nd floor balcony. Also, in her affidavit for restitution of conjugal rights, the appellant/wife has stated that on 06.11.2005, when she was waiting in the balcony of her house for her husband to return, gold bangle slipped from her hands and in the attempt to catch hold of the same, she fell down and sustained injuries.

 

17.With regard to the said incident, the Court below examined the elder son of the appellant and the respondent, viz. Pranav, studying VII standard, as C.W.1. To the question as to how such accident occurred, he answered that his mother jumped from the balcony. When he was questioned as to why his mother jumped, he stated that since it was a Sunday, he, his brother Kush, his cousins Gaurav and Neerav and the children of his father’s friends were all present in his house and that he is not aware of the reason of his mother jumping from the balcony. Again, when he was questioned as to how his mother fell the balcony, he stated that his mother fell down from the 2nd floor balcony of his house, in an attempt to catch hold of the bangle which slipped from her hand.

18.The other child witness, Gaurav, who is the nephew of the respondent/husband was examined by the Court below as C.W.2. He has stated that on the date of the alleged incident, he along with his brothers saw his aunt, i.e. the appellant herein, jumping from the balcony and denied the statement that she fell down in an attempt to catch hold of her bangle. He has also stated that he is not aware of the reason as to why his aunt jumped from the balcony. According to him, at the time of accident, he was inside the house of his Uncle, i.e. the respondent herein and only when he came down from the 2nd floor to his house at the ground floor, he saw his aunt falling from the balcony.

19.A careful analysis of the evidence of Gaurav would show that though he had been in the house of his Uncle, i.e. the respondent herein before the fall of the appellant, during the fall of the appellant, he came down to ground floor and witnessed the incident only from the ground floor. Therefore, he might not be aware as to whether she jumped or fell from the balcony. Whereas, Pranav, the son of the appellant and the respondent, who was in his house at the time of accident, has clearly stated that his mother fell down from the balcony in an attempt to catch hold of the bangle that slipped from her hand. Thus, it is crystal clear that Gaurav has not witnessed the fall of the appellant from the balcony and he is certainly not aware as to why and how she fell from the balcony. Hence, the evidence of Gaurav is contradictory and cannot be believed.

 

20.In the cross-examination, the respondent/husband has stated that he has not registered any complaint regarding the appellant’s attempt to commit suicide and that he took the appellant/wife to Hospital for treatment. It is his further evidence that he appointed a servant-maid to take care of the appellant/wife and that on 24.07.2007, when his wife left for her parent’s house, on 27.07.2007, over phone, he asked her to come back to her matrimonial house. The respondent/husband has also stated that the appellant/wife has mentally tortured him for petty reasons and there was curse, abuse and demand of Rs.5 crores for giving consent divorce. Thereafter, the demand was reduced to Rs.2.5 crores along with an Apartment in her name apart from the maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month. The respondent/husband would submit that the intention of the appellant/wife is only to extort money from him and she had no intention to live with him and take care of her children.

21.Even assuming that the appellant/wife had attempted to commit suicide on 06.11.2005, what prevented the respondent/husband from informing the same to the police, when he has stated in his affidavit that the incident which took place on 06.11.2005 is not first of its kind and that the appellant/wife had attempted to commit suicide on earlier occasions also and that the said attempts were thwarted by him. He could have informed the police about her suicide attempt, which can easily be corroborated by the evidence of his family members, driver and neighbours. Moreover, the said incident had occurred after seven years from the date of marriage. So, this Court cannot assume that fearing police case under Dowry Prohibition Act, the respondent/husband has concealed her suicide attempt. Had the appellant/wife really jumped from the balcony with an intention to commit suicide, which it is stated, was witnessed by the husband, children and driver, definitely, the same could have been reported to the police. It is only Pranav, the elder son, who has in his evidence stated that his mother slipped and fell from the balcony. The evidence of the child C.W.1 is in support of the mother. But, the fact remains that both the children are now living with their father and are not willing to go with their mother. The evidence of the son can be accepted, as he is accepted to be the eye-witness. Hence, this Court is not inclined to disbelieve the evidence of Pranav.

22.Misunderstandings are part and parcel of marital life. If there is no difference of opinion between the husband and wife, then it is certainly a news. Though, in the case on hand, the respondent/husband has stated that his refusal to lend money to the parents of the appellant/wife frustrated her to commit suicide on 06.11.2005, the same ought not have been accepted by the Court below. From the pleadings, it is seen that after the alleged incident, the respondent/husband had taken care of the appellant/wife for nearly two years and thereafter, on account of his leaving to Rajasthan, since there was no one to look after her, the appellant/wife had to move to her mother’s house, which cannot be termed as desertion. If really there was a difference of opinion between the appellant and the respondent and there was an attempt to suicide by the appellant, the respondent would have given such information to the police and there is no reason for him to take care of her for more than two years. It may be true that the wife has not filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights immediately, probably believing that the husband may join her. The very fact that he had appointed a servant-maid to take care of her shows his humanitarian attitude. Even assuming for the sake of argument that in order to avoid a police case, he has not disclosed that the appellant/wife has attempted to commit suicide, no prudent man will remain quiet, if it was a second attempt. There is no proof of repeated attempts of suicide as alleged.

23 Further, the observation of the Court below that the appellant/wife has not examined her father as a witness to rebut the contention of the respondent/husband with regard to lending of money, is not acceptable, as there is no proof to establish that money was lent in huge proportion and frequently.

24.The finding of the Family Court that there was a suicide attempt on 06.11.2005 and that the suicide attempt of the wife cannot be termed as an ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life and that divorce has got to be granted on the ground of cruelty and merely because, a complaint has not been filed under Section 306 IPC does not mean that the offence under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is wiped out, cannot be accepted, as the respondent/husband has not established his case properly with sufficient evidence. The evidence of the children, more particularly the evidence of their son, Pranav is very clear that the injuries suffered by his mother on 06.11.2005 is only due to an accidental fall. The finding that the wife jumped from the balcony in an attempt to commit suicide cannot be accepted. At best, it can be said that it was a fall. The respondent/husband has failed to establish his case. The conclusion of the court below on the basis of the available evidence is erroneous. The petition for restitution of conjugal rights after four years from the date of filing of the divorce petition is no ground to hold it against her for desertion.

25.Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/husband has mainly put forth his arguments on ‘cruelty’ and ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ and has relied on decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and High Courts, to that effect. The allegation of the respondent/husband is that the appellant/wife has caused mental cruelty to him. Mental cruelty is the conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for the party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. The only judgment which may appear to support the case of the respondent/husband is the one rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Mahajan vs. Dimple @ Kajal, (2011) 12 SCC 1, wherein, the wife had caused mental cruelty to the husband by often threatening him that she will commit suicide. That is a case, where mental cruelty alleged against the wife had been proved. But, in the case on hand, though it is strongly alleged that the appellant/wife had caused mental cruelty to the respondent/husband by often threatening him that she will commit suicide if he does not accede to her requests. Such an allegation has not been proved by the respondent/husband.

26 At this juncture, it is worth referring to the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N., (2002) 3 SCC 533, which is reiterated hereunder:

9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.

27.Thus, in view of the above observation made by the Apex Court in Padma Sundara Rao’s case, the decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband in Pankaj Mahajan’s case will not be applicable to the case on hand. The inference drawn by this Court that the injuries sustained by the appellant/wife is certainly an accidental fall, would go to show that there is no room for cruelty in this case. If the appellant/wife’s attempt to commit suicide on 06.11.2005 is not first of its kind, the respondent/husband ought to have let in evidence to corroborate such incident of attempt to suicide. Failure on his part to do so shows that there is no ‘mental cruelty’ by the appellant/wife as alleged by the respondent/husband. Hence, the ground of ‘cruelty’ on which the Court below has answered in favour of the respondent/husband is erroneous and based on no evidence.

28.Coming to the point raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/husband that there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the same cannot be invoked in this case, as one of the parties, viz. the appellant/wife is interested in living with the respondent/husband, which is quite evident from the fact that she did not even think of filing a petition claiming monthly maintenance from her husband. That apart, irretrievable breakdown of marriage has not been incorporated as a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and this Court is unable to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

29.To save the marriage, several mediations were conducted by this Court between the appellant and the respondent. But, compromise could not be arrived at. In fact, even one of us (S.Vaidyanathan,J.) was a party to the mediation while sitting in a Division Bench with Justice S.Rajeswaran. This Court persuaded the children to go and stay with the mother and the same was accepted. In this case, after two years of mediation, the children, having grown up, are obsessed only with the father and they are not willing to go with the mother. Probably, keeping such distance from their mother must be due to the physical inability of the mother, as she is not in a position to look after them. Hence, this Court is left with no other option, but to come to a conclusion that the respondent/husband after taking care of the appellant/wife for two years and thinking that she might not recover, decided to get rid of her by filing a divorce petition.

30.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that there is no element of cruelty established against the appellant/wife and the marriage cannot be said to be irretrievable broken, as the appellant/wife is very much willing to live with the respondent/husband. Therefore, this Court allows these appeals. The decree for dissolution of marriage and dismissal of the plea for restitution of conjugal rights passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai vide judgment dated 25.11.2011 made in F.C.O.P.Nos.1942 of 2008 and 218 of 2011 are set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.   (R.S.,J  (S.V.N.,J)

Internet:   Yes/No  06.04.2016

aeb

To :

The Principal Judge,

Family Court, Chennai.

cropped-29_12_2013-divorce29_s.jpg

. Legal position is well settled that leveling false allegation and getting the respondent/husband and in-laws arrested in false cases in itself is an act of cruelty. Here the two sister-in-laws – one married ten years prior to the marriage of the appellant/wife and another still unmarried and studying Dentistry were also implicated thereby jeopardizing the matrimonial life of the elder nanad and destroying the marriage prospects of the younger one. This itself is sufficient to prove mental cruelty caused to the husband and his family.

For the purpose of seeking divorce on the ground of desertion, the meaning of ‘desertion’ as well what constitutes ‘desertion’ has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in various decisions. In the case reported as (2002) 2 SCC 73 Savitri Pandey V. Prem Chandra Pandey the wife claimed divorce on ground of desertion. The Apex Court held that the wife cannot be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong after marriage. Desertion has been held to mean the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. The relevant discussion is extracted as under:

‘8. “Desertion”, for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting of allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati MANU/SC/0058/1956 : [1956]1SCR838 held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. ….’

In the backdrop of the instances of cruelty being committed on the respondent/husband and his family and the animus deserendi being proved by the respondent/husband to seek a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, the only logical conclusion that could have been arrived at was to dissolve the marriage.

 

 

——————————————————————————————————————————————\

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 143/2015

JAGWATI                                                  ….. Appellant

Represented by:   Mr.Vikas Tomar, Mr.Saman

Yadav and Mr.Simarpal Singh,

Advocates.

versus

GAJENDER KUMAR                                                   ….. Respondent

Represented by: Mr.Vinod Kumar, Advocate.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

PRATIBHA RANI, J. (Oral)

MAT.APP.(F.C.) 143/2015

  1. The appellant/wife is aggrieved by the judgment dated August 21, 2016 whereby a decree has been passed in favour of the respondent/husband dissolving their marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion by her.
  2. In brief, the admitted facts are that the appellant/wife got married to the respondent/husband on May 15, 1998. No issue was born out of this wedlock. The appellant/wife was the only child of her parents. She not only used to visit her parents very frequently but also stay there for about 15-20 days every month. On her visit to her parental home on the death of her father on April 16, 2000, she lived there for about eleven-twelve months.
  3. Since the appellant/wife was not performing the matrimonial obligation by staying away from her matrimonial home and often living at her parental home for years together, a petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed in the year 2003 by the respondent/husband seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The appellant/wife agreed to resume cohabitation and returned to matrimonial home on March 10, 2015. The joy was short lived as admittedly she left after four days and is staying at her parental home since March 14, 2005. The circumstances under which she has gone to parental home on March 14, 2005 were intimated by the respondent/husband to the local Police Station at Kapashera on the same day.
  4. After a long wait for almost five years, in the year 2010 the respondent/husband filed a petition seeking divorce on the grounds specified under Section 13(1)(ia) & (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
  5. The divorce petition was contested by the appellant/wife levelling allegations of cruelty and harassment on account of dowry which she had been tolerating in the hope that better sense would prevail upon her husband. She was forced by her husband and in-laws to live at her parental home. She also filed a complaint before the Women Cell. She claimed that she had no intention to bring an end to cohabitation or break the matrimonial ties which can be gathered from the fact that from the Court she accompanied her husband on March 10, 2005 when he filed a petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. She also pleaded that on March 14, 2005 she did not leave the matrimonial home on her own but after treating her with cruelty she was left at the outskirts of her parental Village Daulatabad by her husband on the pretext that he was going to Madras for 15 days on official work. Thereafter her husband never came to take her back. This compelled her to continue staying at her parent’s house. Even now she is ready and willing to return to matrimonial home and live with respondent/husband as his wife.
  6. Learned Judge, Family Court after examining the testimony of the appellant/wife and respondent/husband, was of the view that appellant/wife had caused mental cruelty to respondent/husband and his family members and also deserted him on March 14, 2005 with animus deserendi. The Family Court took notice of the facts in the Criminal Case No. 116/2005 under Sections 498-A/406/506/34 IPC filed in the Court at Gurgaon by the appellant/wife, even married sister and unmarried sisters were not spared. The proceedings against the two sisters were quashed by Punjab & Haryana High Court. This was considered to be sufficient to prove mental cruelty being caused by the appellant/wife.
  7. On behalf of appellant/wife, Mr. Vikas Kumar, Advocate has submitted that the respondent/husband is in Delhi police. He had used his influence in getting favourable orders. It was the respondent/husband who had been treating the appellant/wife with cruelty so much so that he even did not attend the funeral of his father-in-law. On the contrary, it was the appellant/wife who agreed to return to the matrimonial home on March 10, 2005 during hearing of petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It has been urged by learned counsel for the appellant/wife that the petition under Section 9 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was nothing but a ploy to get rid of the appellant/wife. Learned counsel for the appellant/wife has further submitted that on March 14, 2005 it was the respondent/husband who left the appellant/wife at the outskirt of her parental Village Daulatabad on the pretext that he was going to Madras for 15 days. Believing her husband, the appellant/wife went to her parental home and thereafter her husband never came to take her back. Thus, it was the respondent/husband who had deserted the appellant/wife. Not disputing that a criminal complaint case under Section 498-A/406/506/34 IPC was filed by the appellant/wife, it has been contended that filing of a criminal complaints or an acquittal in the criminal cases do not amount to cruelty.

The appellant/wife is ready and willing to return to the matrimonial home hence the impugned judgment and decree may be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant/wife has relied upon (2010) 4 SCC 476 Ravi Kumar vs. Julmi Devi, (2010) 14 SCC 301 Gurbux Singh vs. Harminder Kaur & 2015 SCC online SC 182 Ramchander vs. Ananta in support of his contentions.

  1. Mr.Vinod Kumar, Advocate for the respondent/husband has submitted that the respondent/husband is merely a Head Constable in Delhi Police unable to exert any kind of influence on Courts in Haryana. He and his family had suffered at the hands of appellant/wife on all fronts. Even his sister who was married ten years prior to the marriage of appellant/wife and his younger unmarried sister who was studying Dentistry (BDS) were made accused. However, finding the allegations against the two sisters to be baseless, the proceedings against them were quashed by Punjab & Haryana High Court. In the criminal case he and his mother have been acquitted on January 28, 2014 after suffering humiliation and agony of trial for nine years. Since the parties had been living separately since 2005, after facing all kind of social stigma as well fighting legal battle, there is no scope of reunion.
  2. A perusal of the affidavit Ex. RW-1/A filed by the appellant/wife before the Family Court shows that in the said affidavit she has stated that she was pressurized to bring `60,000 from her parents for purchase of Bullet Motorcycle and was harassed and taunted for poor quality of the articles given in the marriage. She was also compelled to at least have a plot from her parents as she was the only child. She admits that she used to stay at her parental home but justifies that circumstances at her in-laws were not conducive and that after the death of her father she was taking care of her mother. She admits leaving the matrimonial home just after four days on March 14, 2005 after joining the company of her husband on March 10, 2005. During hearing of petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 the different versions emerging on record about the circumstances in which the appellant/wife left the matrimonial home to stay at her parental house are as under:

(i) Written Statement – Para 4 – Preliminary Objection – During stay of four days she was subjected to indignity and abuses by her husband and family members. In order to get rid of her, on the excuse that he was proceeding to Madras for 15 days in connection with his duties and did not want to leave her alone in the house, left her at the outskirts of the village Daultabad and never came to take her back.

(ii) In reply para 9 wherein the husband has pleaded about the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and his wife agreeing of joining him on March 10, 2005 in the Court at Gurgaon, pleaded that once at the matrimonial home she again started threatening and forcing him to leave at her parental home. Ultimately on March 14, 2005 he left her at her parental home and intimation was also given to Police Station Kapashera on the same day vide DD No. 43B. It was further pleaded that she had filed multiple cases against him and his family as ulterior motives.

(iii) In reply to above para 9 she denied extending any threat or insisting to return to parental house. She pleaded that the cases filed by her were based on true facts. Though not pleaded in para 9 as to in what manner she was left at parental home in para 7 she pleaded that she was forced to live at her parental home by the petitioner and in para 4 of the preliminary objections she has taken the plea that on the pretext of going to Madras for 15 days on official work she was left by the husband at the outskirts of village Daultabad and did not come back to take her.

  1. In para 7 of the affidavit she stated as under:

“The petitioner left the deponent at the outskirts of village Daulatabad. Thereafter the petitioner never came back to take the deponent. In the above said circumstances the deponent is living at her parental home. The deponent has never deserted the petitioner and never committed any cruelties with the petitioner. Being a Hindu devoted wife the deponent is still ready to live with the petitioner if undertakes not to repeat the acts of cruelties in the future.”

  1. However, in cross-examination of PW-1 respondent/husband the suggestion given on behalf of the wife/appellant is to the following effect:

“It is incorrect to suggest that the respondent never treated me or my family members with cruelty or that she never deserted me. It is incorrect to suggest that the contents of my affidavit as evidence Ex. PW-1/A are false and fabricated. It is incorrect to suggest that the respondent was harassed by me, my mother and other family members for bringing insufficient dowry. It is incorrect to suggest that due to the continuous harassment and beating the respondent was forced to leave the matrimonial home.”

  1. DD No.43B recorded as ‘peshbandi’ though earlier exhibited but later on de-exhibited records that on March 14, 2005 at 3:50 pm the respondent/husband reported that in the case pending since April 23, 2003, as per direction of the Court he brought his wife on March 10, 2005 to his home directly from the Court. On that date i.e. March 14, 2005 at her instance she has been dropped at her parental home as she was extending threat and that after leaving her there he had come to give this information.
  2. The suggestion given to the respondent/husband by the appellant/wife clearly suggests that it is not a case where she was made to leave the matrimonial home and left at the outskirts of village by her husband on the pretext that he was going to Madras. Rather she has suggested that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home which again is a version in conflict with the pleas taken in the written statement as well in the affidavit.
  3. In her cross-examination she has admitted that after the death of her father on April 16, 2000 she remained at her parental home for about 11-12 months. Again she left the matrimonial home in the year 2003 and thereafter filed a complaint with the Women Cell, Gurgaon. Then in the year 2003 when the respondent/husband filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 she joined him on March 10, 2005 remained there till March 14, 2005 and since then she is residing at her parental home. She has admitted that in the case filed by her under Section 498-A/406/506/34 IPC against her husband and family, they have been acquitted. Since she has justified her stay on the ground that she was taking care of her mother, she was questioned about the age of her mother she informed her date of birth to be April 10, 1959 meaning thereby that her mother was 41-42 years at that time and did not require any medical care especially when after the death of the father in the year 2000 she had stayed with her for about one year. This gave enough time to her mother to bear the loss of her husband as well to the appellant/wife to come to the terms on loss of her father.
  4. What compelled her to again leave the matrimonial home which led her husband to file petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in the year 2003 has not emerged on record.
  5. It is admitted fact by the appellant/wife that after a short union and leaving on March 14, 2005 she never returned to the matrimonial home.

Rather she was busy in prosecuting her criminal case under Section 498- A/406/506/34 IPC instituted on April 08, 2005 which has been finally decided on January 28, 2014. Even the petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed in 2003 wherein she agreed to join her husband after two years on March 10, 2005. After leaving the matrimonial home on March 14, 2005, she was fiercely prosecuting the Criminal Complaint No. 116/2005 (date of institution is April 08, 2005) and had it been a case of she being left on some pretext, the matrimonial relations having become normal between the two between 10th to 14th March, 2005 and she would not have prosecuted with her complaint.

  1. The appellant/wife is breathing hot and cold in the same breath. On the one hand she is projecting herself to be victim of harassment on account of dowry demand, being treated with cruelty by her husband and in-laws on account of dowry demands not being fulfilled, on the other hand even today she claims that she was/is ready and willing to join her husband and that she had never any intention to bring an end to cohabitation or that she was waiting for her husband to take her back.
  2. A perusal of certified copies of the judgment Ex. PW-1/2 in Criminal Case No. 116 under Section 498/406/506 IPC reveals that the testimony of the appellant/wife who was the sole witness in the said case was not considered trustworthy especially highlighting that she had not even examined her mother to substantiate the accusations made in the criminal complaint case.
  3. Legal position is well settled that leveling false allegation and getting the respondent/husband and in-laws arrested in false cases in itself is an act of cruelty. Here the two sister-in-laws – one married ten years prior to the marriage of the appellant/wife and another still unmarried and studying Dentistry were also implicated thereby jeopardizing the matrimonial life of the elder nanad and destroying the marriage prospects of the younger one. This itself is sufficient to prove mental cruelty caused to the husband and his family. The other two accused i.e. husband and his mother have earned honourable acquittal in the criminal cases is proved from certified copy of judgment Ex. PW-1/2.
  4. We have gone through the reports cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/wife.

(i) In the decision reported as (2010) 4 SCC 476 Ravi Kumar Vs. Julmidevi relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant/wife, it was held that the parties alleging desertion must not only prove the other spouse was living separately but also animus deserendi on its part, and spouse claiming desertion must prove that it has not conducted itself in a manner which furnishes reasonable cause for the other spouse to stay away from matrimonial home.

(ii) In decision reported as (2010) 14 SCC 301 Gurbux Singh Vs. Harminder Kaur relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant/wife, it was held that even a single act of violence which is of grievous and inexcusable nature satisfies test of cruelty, married life should be assessed as a whole – A few isolated instances over certain period do not amount to cruelty.

(iii) In decision reported as (2015) SCC Online SC 182 Ramchander vs. Ananta it was held that instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation but to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record.

  1. There cannot be any quarrel about the legal proposition laid down in the above reports cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/wife. The question is the applicability of those legal principles in the facts of the instant case. We have already discussed the evidence adduced by the parties as well the admission extracted from the appellant/wife in her cross-examination as to how she left the matrimonial home on March 14, 2005 and never returned thereafter.
  2. By placing reliance on the decisions in Ravi Kumar vs. Julmi Devi (Supra), Gurbux Singh vs. Harminder Kaur (Supra) & Ramchander vs. Ananta (Supra), the appellant can hardly get any support in the facts of her case rather the ratio of above judgments support the case of the respondent/husband for the reason that there is admission by the appellant/wife about deserting respondent/husband on March 14, 2005 with animus deserendi. Since 2005 till 2015 for nine years she had been prosecuting her husband and mother-in-law.
  3. For the purpose of seeking divorce on the ground of desertion, the meaning of ‘desertion’ as well what constitutes ‘desertion’ has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in various decisions. In the case reported as (2002) 2 SCC 73 Savitri Pandey V. Prem Chandra Pandey the wife claimed divorce on ground of desertion. The Apex Court held that the wife cannot be permitted to take advantage of her own wrong after marriage. Desertion has been held to mean the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. The relevant discussion is extracted as under:

‘8. “Desertion”, for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting of allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati MANU/SC/0058/1956 : [1956]1SCR838 held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. ….’

  1. In the backdrop of the instances of cruelty being committed on the respondent/husband and his family and the animus deserendi being proved by the respondent/husband to seek a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, the only logical conclusion that could have been arrived at was to dissolve the marriage.
  2. We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
  3. No costs.

CM No.29321/2015 Dismissed as infructuous.

PRATIBHA RANI (JUDGE) PRADEEP NANDRAJOG (JUDGE)

Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offense of rape, is guilty of the offense of adultery.

According to Hinduism dictionary,” Adultery is sexual intercourse between a married man and a woman not his wife, or between a married woman and a man not her husband.”

adultery is, as a general rule, proved by presumptive proof based upon;

(a) circumstantial evidence;

(b) evidence of non-access and the birth of children;

(c) contracting venereal diseases;

(d) by evidence of visits to house of ill-repute;

(e) decrees and admissions made in previous proceedings; and

(f) confessions and admissions of the parties which should be generally corroborated though in exceptional circumstances, even if uncorroborated may be acted upon.

Therefore, it is important to understand that mere bald allegations by a spouse that his/her partner was having adulterous relationship with his/her lover after marriage, in absence of any cogent evidence, would not be sufficient to prove.

What is the Punishment in Indian Penal Code for Adultery. ?

In India the offence of adultery is punishable under Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. As it stands, this Section makes only men having sexual intercourse with the wives of other men without the consent of their husbands punishable and women cannot be punished even as abettors.

Section-497- Adultery “Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case, the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.

Advocate Prachi Singh

     South Delhi Office:

  • A-381,Lower Ground Floor,
  • Defence Colony,New Delhi-110024
  • Phone: +91-11-40513913
  • Mobile: +91-9811114265

      East Delhi Office

What is the Legal Position when  refusal to have sexual intercourse by Partner ?

Whether refusal to have sexual intercourse amounts to cruelty or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Sexual intercourse is just one of marital rights. No doubt, the denial of sexual relations causes frustration and misery to the aggrieved party and is likely to destroy the fibre of marriage yet reasonable denial on the part of either party does not constitute cruelty. This aspect of marital obligation has been dealt with in most elaborate manner in Jacobson vs. Jacobson, 130 Ny.S.II D 762. It is observed that this obligation is of a personal and delicate nature and depends on sentiments and feelings to such an extent that it would be an intrusion into the privacy of domestic life to stipulate reasonable denial on the part of either party to submit to marital intercourse constitutes cruelty. Such denial does not constitute cruelty even though refusal to have marital sexual relations undermines the essential structure of a marriage.

 

Advocate Prachi Singh

     South Delhi Office:

  • A-381,Lower Ground Floor,
  • Defence Colony,New Delhi-110024
  • Phone: +91-11-40513913
  • Mobile: +91-9811114265

      East Delhi Office

According to divorce laws, adultery is voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender’s wife or husband. Rayden defines it as “Consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage. It is no more necessary that a person should continue living in adultery. Single act of intercourse constitutes adultery.

Thus the adultery is to be inferred from circumstances which must indicate inclination, guilty intention and opportunity to commit adultery. Bed room evidence is one of such strong circumstances as way back in 1909 in Kerr v. Kerr, 114 App. Div. 1421, it was observed that where man and a woman who are not husband and wife have bed room privacy, there is strong inference of adultery as they do not sing prayers there.

        Advocate Prachi Singh  

     South Delhi Office:

  • A-381,Lower Ground Floor,
  • Defence Colony,New Delhi-110024
  • Phone: +91-11-40513913
  • Mobile: +91-9811114265

        East Delhi Office

 

29_12_2013-divorce29_sHow to get Divorce in India through Court in India.

India has different divorce laws for different religions. Almost all the religions has their own divorce laws in India which are used among themselves. There are separate laws for inter-cast or inter-religion marriages. Divorce laws in India for Hindus is described in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Hindu Marriage Act is also used for Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains as they don’t have their own separate marriage and divorce laws. Here is the list of various divorce laws in India for various religions:

Hindu (including Sikhs, Jains and Buddists) : Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Muslims : Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939

Christians : Indian Divorce Act, 1869

Parsis : The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936

Inter-Cast of Inter-Religion : Special Marriage Act, 1954

The Indian Divorce, Act Special Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and the Hindu Marriage Act, provide for annulment of the marriage, since its very inception, on grounds such as the non-fulfillment of mandatory conditions.. The Indian Divorce act requires confirmation by the High Court to come into effect.

Grounds for Divorce in India

In India divorce is granted mainly on 4 different grounds.

  1. Adultery
  2. Desertion
  3. Cruelty
  4. Impotency
  5. Chronic Diseases

 

Contested Divorce under Hindu Marriage Act 1955

Divorce. —

(1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party—

16 [(i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or]

16 [(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or]

16 [(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or]

(ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or

17 [(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

Explanation .—In this clause,—

(a) the expression “mental disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;

(b) the expression “psychopathic disorder” means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or]

(iv) has 18 [***] been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or

(v) has 18 [***] been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or

(vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or

(vi) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; 19 [***] 20 [ Explanation. —In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.]

Mutual Consent Divorce under Hindu Marriage Act.

mutual divorce

Divorce by Mutual Consent

Seeking a divorce in India is a long-drawn out legal affair, where the period of prosecution takes a minimum of six months. However, the time and money required to obtain a divorce can be considerably shortened if the couple seeks divorce by mutual consent. In this case, estranged spouses can mutually agree to a settlement and file for a “no-fault divorce” under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. All marriages which have been solemnized before or after the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act 1976, are entitled to make use of the provision of divorce by mutual consent. However, for filing for a divorce on this ground, it is necessary for the husband and wife to have lived separately for at least a year.

Sec.13-B of Hindu Marriage Act 1955- Divorce by mutual consent.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the mean time, the Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree.

Procedure for Filing for Divorce

The procedure for seeking a divorce by mutual consent, is initiated by filing a petition, supported by affidavits from both partners, in the district court. Known as the First Motion Petition for Mutual Consent Divorce, this should contain a joint statement by both partners, that due to their irreconcilable differences, they can no longer stay together and should be granted a divorce by the court. After six months, the Second Motion Petition for Mutual Consent Divorce should be filed by the couple and they are required reappear in the court. A gap of six months is given between the two motions, so as to offer the estranged couple adequate time to reconsider their decision of dissolving their marriage. After hearings from the husband and wife, if the judge is satisfied that all the necessary grounds and requirements for the divorce have been met, the couple is granted a mutual divorce decree. Some of the important issues on which the couple should have agreed, in their petition for divorce by mutual consent, are custody of child, alimony to wife, return of dowry items or “streedhan” and litigation expenses.

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE UNDER HINDU MARRIAGE ACT:

marriage

There are two ways to legally end a marriage – annulment and divorce. An annulment is a legal procedure which cancels a marriage between a man and a woman. Annulling a marriage is as though it is completely erased – legally, it declares that the marriage never technically existed and was never valid. A divorce, or legal dissolution of a marriage, is the ending of a valid marriage between a man and a woman returning both parties to single status with the ability to remarry. While each individual state has its own laws regarding the grounds for an annulment or for a divorce, certain requirements apply nationwide.

An annulment case can be initiated by either the husband or the wife in the marriage. The party initiating the annulment must prove that he or she has the grounds to do so and if it can be proven, the marriage will be considered null and void by the court. The following is a list of common grounds for annulment and a short explanation of each point:

Bigamy – either party was already married to another person at the time of the marriage
Forced Consent – one of the spouses was forced or threatened into marriage and only entered into it under duress.

Fraud – one of the spouses agreed to the marriage based on the lies or misrepresentation of the other.

Marriage Prohibited By Law – Marriage between parties that based on their familial relationship is considered incestuous.

Mental Illness – either spouse was mentally ill or emotionally disturbed at the time of the marriage.

Mental Incapacity – either spouse was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the marriage and was unable to make informed consent.

Inability to Consummate Marriage –
 either spouse was physically incapable of having sexual relations or impotent during the marriage.

Underage Marriage – either spouse was too young to enter into marriage without parental consent or court approval.

Depending on your state of residence, a divorce can be much more complicated than an annulment. Like annulment cases, each state has its own set of laws regarding divorce. In most divorce cases, marital assets are divided and debts are settled. If the marriage has produced children, a divorce proceeding determines custody of the children, visitation rights and spousal and child support issues.

Each state can have either a “no-fault” divorce or a “fault” divorce. A no-fault divorce allows the dissolution of a legal marriage with neither spouse being named the “guilty party” or the cause for the marital break-up.

Many states now offer the “no-fault” divorce option, a dissolution of a legal marriage in which neither party accepts blame for the marital break-up. In the absence of a “guilty party,” some states require a waiting period of a legal separation before a no-fault divorce can take place. For this reason, in addition to cases where one spouse wishes to assign blame, some parties seek to expedite the legal process by pursuing a traditional, “fault” divorce.

A “fault” divorce is only granted when one spouse can prove adequate grounds. Like an annulment, these grounds vary from state to state, however, there are some overarching commonalities. These guidelines often include addition to drugs, alcohol or gambling, incurable mental illness, and conviction of a crime. The major grounds for divorce that apply in every state are listed below:
Adultery – one or both spouses engages in extramarital relationships with others during the marriage.

Desertion – one spouse abandons the other, physically and emotionally, for a lengthy period of time.

Physical/Emotional Abuse – one spouse subjects the other to physical or violent attacks or emotional or psychological abuse such as abusive language, and threats of physical violence.

Your state law and particular situation will determine whether or not your annulment or divorce will be simple or complex. Familiarizing yourself with the laws for your particular state is the best way to learn what your rights are in the case of a marital dissolution.

Nullity of marriage and divorce:- Void marriages Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v), Section 5. 12. Voidable.

Marriages.-(1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:-
(a) that the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotency of the respondent; or

(b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of Section 5; or

(c) that the consent of the petitioner, or where the consent of the guardian in marriage of the petitioner was required under Section 5 as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, the consent of such guardian was obtained by force or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent; or

(d) that the respondent was at the time of the marriage pregnant by some person other than the petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no petition for annulling a marriage-

(a) on the ground specified in clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained if-

(i) the petition is presented more than one year after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered ; or

(ii) the petitioner has, with his or her full consent, lived with the other party to the marriage as husband or wife after the force had ceased to operate or, as the case may be, the fraud had been discovered;

(b) on the ground specified in clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be entertained unless the court is satisfied-

(i) that the petitioner was at the time of the marriage ignorant of the facts alleged;

(ii) that proceedings have been instituted in the case of a marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act within one year of such commencement and in the case of marriages solemnized after such commencement within one year from the date of the marriage; and

(iii) that marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of the said ground.

The substantial questions of law which arise for consideration in this appeal are as to whether the foreign judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the State of New York is valid and binding on the parties and whether the said judgment dissolved the relationship of marriage between the parties.

1191559-judgegavel-1475280720-466-640x480

The case made out by the plaintiff in the plaint that no other forum save and except the forum in India having jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is competent to pass a decree of divorce is not acceptable in law. That the relationship of marriage governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be dissloved by foreign decree of divorce has been long recognised by the Courts in India.The decision reported in AIR 1975 SC 105 (Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh) is a complete answer to the aforesaid question. Their Lordships have held that foreign decrees of divorce including decrees of Sister States are to be either accorded recognition or to be treated as invalid depending upon the circumstances of each case. Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes a foreign judgment conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties except-

Section 14, C.P.C. creates a presumption that a foreign judgment, certified copy of which has been produced was a judgment pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary appears on the record, but such presumption may be displaced by proving want of jurisdiction. Thus a combined reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes the position of law clear that if a certified copy of a foreign judgment is produced in a court of law directly adjudicating upon any matter between the same parties, the same shall be presumed by a court to have been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary is proved.

Orissa High Court

Dr. Padmini Mishra vs Dr. Ramesh Chandra Mishra

Equivalent citations: AIR 1991 Ori 263, II (1990) DMC 408

Author: P Mishra

Bench: P Misra

JUDGMENT P.C. Mishra, J.

  1. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the wife for obtaining a decree of divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The present appellant as plaintiff instituted the suit (O. S. No. 48/ 83-I) in the court of Subordinate Judge, Bhubaneswar praying for dissolution of the marriage on the ground, of ill-treatment and cruelty by her husband (respondent in this appeal). The suit was decreed by the trial Court. But the appellate court reversed the judgment on a finding that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant stands dissolved with effect from 18-1-1980 by the decree passed by the Supreme Court of County of Albany (U.S. A.) When this appeal was placed for admission, the respondent entered appearance through Advocates and both parties prayed for final disposal of the appeal at the stage of admission saying that a complaint case has been filed by the mother of the present appellant against the respondent and his old father alleging that the respondent is guilty of bigamy and a Criminal Revision (Criminal Revision No. 98/86) is pending in this Court to quash the proceeding. It was stated by the counsel for both parties that apart from the other questions of fact which may be required to be proved to bring home the charge of bigamy, the question as to whether the marriage was dissolved with effect from 18-1-1980 by the judgment of the foreign Court would be one of the most relevant points for consideration and the said point is the only question for consideration in this appeal. Accordingly the L.C.R. was called for and this appeal was heard at length for final disposal of the appeal.
  1. As already stated the plaintiff filed the suit praying for dissolution of the marriage mainly on the ground of ill-treatment and cruelly. Admittedly the marriage was performed at Bhubaneswar on 18-5-1974 whereafter plaintiff and the defendant lived as husband and wife for some time at Bhubaneswar, and thereafter went to Delhi. The defendant-husband left for U.S.A. shortly thereafter and the plaintiff joined her husband some time in April, 1975. According to the plaintiff, she lived with her husband in U.S.A. till August, 1975., during which time she found that the relationship is getting strained and there was temperamentally incompatibility. During her stay in U.S.A. she found that the behaviour of her husband was intolerable and under the circumstances she left her husband and returned to India to be with her parents. It has also been alleged in the plaint that her husband has obtained a void decree of divorce from the Supreme Court of County of Albany in the State of New York in U.S.A. which, according to her, is incompetent to dissolve a Hindu marriage, as it is not a forum created under the Hindu Marriage Act. Since the said decree of divorce is neither operative nor enforceable in law, she has filed the suit almost for the same relief from a court of competent jurisdiction. In the written statement of the defendant the allegations of illtreatment, misbehaviour and cruelty were stoutly denied. It was further alleged that the plaintiff voluntarily deserted the defendant and went away for Delhi for her own purposes and was, therefore, guilty of desertion. According to the defendant, all his attempts for reconciliation having failed, he filed a case for divorce in the Supreme Court of County of Albany in the State of New York in U.S.A. on the ground of desertion for a continuous period of about 4 years. The defendant asserts that the Surpeme Court of the State of New York is a competent court having jurisdiction in relation to a dispute involving matrimonial relationship between the parties, since the plaintiff and defendant last lived together and cohabitated in the State of New York. The decree for divorce granted by the Supreme Court on 18-1-1980 was after due notice to the plaintiff, which as stated by the defendant is binding on the parties and has already severed the marital relationship between them. It was, therefore, urged that the question of dissolution of the marriage or granting a decree for divorce did not arise at all as by the date of the suit there existed no such relationship. The learned trial Court held that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York in U.S.A. was void under Section 13(3) of the Civil Procedure Code as the same was obtained by making a false representation as to the jurisdictional facts. The contention of the plaintiff that the Supreme Court of the State of New York in the County of Albany is not a District Court within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act and that the decree is void on that ground was, however, not accepted by the learned trial court. It was further found that the plaintiff has successfully established that during her stay in U.S.A. defendant treated her with cruelty and deserted her. On these findings the learned trial court dissolved the marriage by a decree of divorce with effect from the date of the judgment. The defendant-husband came up in appeal and the District Judge, Puri in the judgment, impugned in this appeal, allowed the same, as according to him, the foreign judgment dissolving the marriage with effect from the 18th January, 1980 is conclusive and binding on the parties and the present proceeding for divorce is not maintainable. It appears from the appellate judgment that finding as regards ill-treatment and cruelty was not effectively challenged before the appellate court and consequently the appellate court has not recorded any finding whatsoever on that issue.
  1. The substantial questions of law which arise for consideration in this appeal are as to whether the foreign judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the State of New York is valid and binding on the parties and whether the said judgment dissolved the relationship of marriage between the parties.
  1. The case made out by the plaintiff in the plaint that no other forum save and except the forum in India having jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 is competent to pass a decree of divorce is not acceptable in law. That the relationship of marriage governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can be dissloved by foreign decree of divorce has been long recognised by the Courts in India.The decision reported in AIR 1975 SC 105 (Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh) is a complete answer to the aforesaid question. Their Lordships have held that foreign decrees of divorce including decrees of Sister States are to be either accorded recognition or to be treated as invalid depending upon the circumstances of each case. Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes a foreign judgment conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties except-

(a) where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) where it has not been given on the merits of the case;

(c) where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognise law of India in cases in which such law is applicable;

(d) where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained are opposed to natural justice;

(e) where it has been obtained by fraud; and

(f) where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India.

  1. Section 14, C.P.C. creates a presumption that a foreign judgment, certified copy of which has been produced was a judgment pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary appears on the record, but such presumption may be displaced by proving want of jurisdiction. Thus a combined reading of Sections 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes the position of law clear that if a certified copy of a foreign judgment is produced in a court of law directly adjudicating upon any matter between the same parties, the same shall be presumed by a court to have been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary is proved. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, the appellant tried to bring her case within Clause (e) of Section 13 of Civil Procedure Code contending that the decree passed by the Supreme Court of County of Albany in the United States of America was obtained by fraud. It was urged that the appellant was not a resident of New York when the foreign decree was passed and that material facts were suppressed by the respondent in the foreign court and there is no discussion in the judgment passed by the said Court as to how and under what circumstances a decree for divorce was passed by it. It was also urged that the proceeding in the foreign Court was without due notice to the appellant for which the judgment passed therein would not bind, the plaintiff-appellant. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent in his reply argued that the aforesaid contentions of the appellant cannot be entertained at the stage of Second Appeal since no allegation of fraud has been made out in the plaint far less the particulars thereof. For appreciating the aforesaid point the entire L.C.R. which was called for from the courts below was examined. The plaintiff-appellant in para 15 of the plaint has made a mention of the fact that the defendant has obtained a void decree of divorce from the Supreme Court of County of Albany in the State of New York in U.S.A. and has further stated in para 16 of the plaint that the said decree having not been passed by a forum in India as appointed under the law is incompetent to pass a decree of divorce. In para 17 of the plaint the operative part of the order in the foreign judgment has been quoted and it has been stated therein that the defendant by his act and omission is estopped from contesting the present proceeding. Nothing further has been said as to whether the foreign judgment referred to therein was obtained by fraud or the reasons for which it was said to be void. The rule of pleadings as given in Rule 2 of Order 6, C.P.C. requires that it must contain all the material facts on which a party relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. Rule 4 of the said Order requires that wherever necessary, particulars of such material facts are also to be given, the object being to enable the adversary to know what case he has to meet and thus to prevent a surprise at the trial and to limit the generality of the pleadings and so to define and limit the issues to be tried, thereby saving unnecessary time and expenses. The aforesaid rule is mandatory in nature. It has been stressed time and again that where fraud is alleged, particulars thereof should be given and the allegations constituting fraud must be clear, definite and specific. In a decision reported in AIR 1969 SC 583 (Dr. Lakhi Prasad Agarwal v. Nathmal Dokania) their Lordships have held that general allegations, in howsoever strong words they may be, if unaccompanied by particulars, are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud. In this case far from giving the particulars of fraud the plaint does not contain any allegation of fraud whatsoever. Finding this difficulty the learned counsel appearing for the appellant filed an application for amendment of the memorandum of appeal wherein in the pretext of incorporating further substantial questions of law, various questions of fact which were totally absent in the pleading were sought to be introduced. The learned counsel for the appellant was heard at length as to whether it would be permissible in law to introduce new questions of fact in the memorandum of appeal, which did not at all find place in the pleadings. Learned counsel filed another petition under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. praying for leave of the Court to amend the plaint. The schedule of amendment seeks to introduce various new facts such as: (i) that the parties never stayed any where inside the State of New York in U.S.A.; (ii) that the plaintiff never received summons from the Supreme Court of New York in the proceeding initiated there for obtaining a decree of dissolution of marriage; (iii) that the defendant had gone to U.S.A. only for studies having no intention whatsoever to permanently stay in the State of New York in U.S.A. and, therefore, did not acquire domicile in U.S.A.; (iv) that no jurisdictional facts have been stated in the foreign judgment and there is no finding therein as to the jurisdictional facts; (v) that the foreign judgment is not a judgment on merit and is founded on an incorrect view of international law and is also vitiated by refusal to recognise by the law of India; (vi) that the judgment has been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, i.e. by suppression of summons by the defendant and misrepresentation with regard to the residence within the State of New York; and (vii) that the copy of the judgment, which has been marked as Ext. A is a forged document. It has already been stated that the plaintiff in her plaint itself has made a specific reference to the foreign judgment and has quoted the ordering portion thereof. The foreign judgment was passed on 18th Jan. 1980 and the suit was filed about three years thereafter. The defendant in his written statement specifically alleged that the Supreme Court of the State of New York is a competent court having jurisdiction in matrimonial relationship of the parties since the plaintiff and the defendant last lived together and cohabitated in the State of New York and that after due notice to the plaintiff, the aforesaid case of divorce was decided on merit and the decree of divorce was passed by the said Supreme Court on 18-1-1980. Authenticated copies of the judgment and the decree of the said Court were filed as Annexures 1 and 2 to the written statement, which were to be read as part of the written statement itself. The said written statement was filed in the month of May, 1984. The facts now sought to be introduced in the plaint by way of amendment could have been alleged in the plaint when it was filed inasmuch as the plaintiff was aware of the proceeding of divorce and the decree passed therein by the Supreme Court in the State of New York or at least all those facts could be introduced by way of amendment after the written statement was filed wherein specific averments were made as regards the jurisdictional facts and about the service of notice by the foreign Court. It may be noted that the plaintiff had once filed an application in the trial court for amendment of the plaint to add some allegations regarding the subsequent second marriage of the defendant, but not the facts now sought to be introduced. The appellate court did not accept the contention that the foreign judgment is not binding on the parties on the ground that none of the exceptions mentioned in Section 13 has been pleaded or proved by the plaintiff. In spite of the above, no grounds were taken at the first instance in this Second Appeal on the basis of the facts now alleged. The amendment sought for is, therefore, not only belated, but has been conceived only to meet the legal difficulties which the appellant faced during the course of argument. The petition for amendment of the plaint is supported by an affidavit of the mother of the plaintiff and not by the plaintiff herself. In the affidavit it has been stated that she is the special power of attorney holder of the plaintiff and has been authorised under the power of attorney to take all steps, file affidavits, plaints, appeals etc. and to engage lawyers on behalf of the plaintiff in the trial court and in the appellate court. The pleadings are required to be signed and verified by the party or ,a person duly authorised by him and so also an application for amendment of the pleadings. The affidavit appended to the application for amendment by the mother of the plaintiff does not specify as to whether she has been authorised to sign or verify the plaint in the absence of which it cannot be assumed that she has been so authorised. The introduction of the aforesaid new facts in the plaint by way of amendment would necessarily mean trial of the suit de novo from the stage of framing of issues. In the application it has been stated that in the year 1983 the plaintiff had come to India for about two weeks to participate in the religious rites following the death of her father and there was little time to instruct her advocate for the purpose of filing of the plaint. She merely handed over whatever papers were there with her to her Advocate Sri G. S. Rath for the purpose of drafting the plaint and that she had signed the plaint when prepared, without applying her mind as she was in a distressed state of mind. The aforesaid explanation after a lapse of more than 9 years from the date of filing of plaint for the first time in a second appeal is not acceptable to any court of law. It appears from Exts. 5, 6, 1 and 2 that the plaintiff had sent legal notices through her counsel in New Delhi repeatedly insisting that any action for dissolution of marriage in U.S.A. would not be in accordance with law as administered in India and, therefore, any proceeding taken there for divorce would not be recognised. In a letter dated 4-1-1980 the Attorney at law for the present respondent wrote to Rakesh Dayal, who was then the lawyer corresponding on instruction of the present plaintiff to the effect that the present respondent has resided in the State of New York for a period in excess of two years and that the plaintiff has been properly served with the summons and also that the State of New York wilt have jurisdiction for the action taken for divorce. These documents add further strength to infer that the various pleas offset now sought to be introduced by way of amendment of the plaint are afterthought and intended to prolong the litigation. Though delay in making an application for amendment would not by itself be sufficient for its rejection, it may be one of the facts to be taken into account in granting or refusing the amendment. The predominant consideration for dealing with the application for amendment of a pleading is whether the amendment is necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties and whether the amendment can be allowed without injustice to the otherside. From the discussions made above, it would be clear that the amendment of the plaint sought for by the appellant at this stage cannot be said to be one intended for determining the real question in controversy between the parties nor can it be said to be bona fide. As already stated, such an amendment, if allowed, would necessarily have the consequence of permitting the suit to be tried afresh from the stage of framing of the issues as none of the questions now raised was the subject-matter of the suit at the stage of trial. Thus the amendment of the plaint now sought for, if allowed would cause serious prejudice and injustice to the defendant. I would, therefore, conclude that the petitions for amendment of the plaint and also the memorandum of appeal are liable to be rejected, which I hereby do.
  1. The amendment of the plaint sought for having been refused, the matter has to proceed on the basis of the pleadings already on record. It has, therefore, to be decided as to whether the foreign judgment (Ext. A) would be conclusive between the parties as regards the matter which was adjudicated upon. I have already indicated that a combined reading of Sections 13 & 14 of the Civil Procedure Code suggests that a foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the parties and production of a certified copy of the foreign judgment, and the court shall presume that such judgment was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary appears on the record or such presumption is displaced by proving want of jurisdiction. The only exceptions under which the aforesaid conclusiveness would not be attached to the foreign judgment have been specified in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. I have already dealt with the requirement of Clause (e) of the said section where a foreign judgment shall not be conclusive where it has been obtained by fraud. The plea of fraud has not at all been taken by the plaintiff in her plaint and no particulars or material facts which would constitute fraud have either been pleaded or proved by the plaintiff. Therefore, the said ground on which the foreign judgment is now challenged is without any basis whatsoever.
  1. Mr. Patnaik, learned counsel for the appellant finding that the ground of fraud on which the case was tried to be built up is not supportable for want of pleadings contended that Ext. A is not the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by the Supreme Court of the State of New York and, therefore, the presumption under Section 14 of the Civil Procedure Code would not be available in respect of the said foreign judgment. It appears that similar objection was taken during the course of argument of the suit in the trial court by the plaintiff which necessitated the filing of the certified copy of the Ext. A by the defendant and the same is available in the records of the trial court. The certified copy of the foreign judgment having thus been filed, there is no merit in the contention that the presumptions under Section 14 C.P.C. would not be available in this case. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that Ext. A. which purports to be a foreign judgment is not a genuine document as it is self contradictory in terms and cannot, therefore, be relied upon. It was pointed out that the judgment is said to have been passed on 18th January, 1980, where as in the narration therein it has been stated that the court was held in the County of Albany on 24th January, 1980. The aforesaid discrepancy appears to be a typing mistake inasmuch as the date has been corrected from 24th of January, 1980 to 10th January, 1980 at the top of the document and the signature of the Judge is dated 18th January, 1980 where as such correction has not been effected in the body of the judgment. That a judgment has been pronounced by the Supreme Court in the State of New York dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant stands admitted in the plaint. In para 17 of the plaint the ordering portion of the judgment has been quoted. The judgment was marked as an ‘Exhibit’ without objection. In the circumstances, there is no room for doubting the genuineness of the Ext. A and, therefore, I do not find any merit in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Patnaik.
  1. Mr. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the appellant wanted to challenge the foreign judgment (Ext. A) also on the ground that it has not been passed by a court of competent jurisdiction inasmuch as the parties were not the bona fide residents in the Staste of New York and, therefore, the Supreme Court of New York had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding for divorce. There is evidence on record in this case to show that the appellant went to America and resided with the respondent for about 3 months before returning to India in August, 1975. It goes almost by admission that both of them resided at America for the last time and the place of residence of the respondent has never been disputed by the appellant at any point of time. Merely because the appellant came away from America or was residing at different places when the proceeding for divorce was instituted in the year 1979, the court of New work would not lose jurisdiction to entertain the case. There is nothing on record to assume that the respondent was not a resident of New York at the time when the proceeding was instituted or when the decree was obtained. I have gone through the documents marked as Exts. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 which are correspondences between the lawyers of the parties from which it would be apparent that each of them had the intention of getting a decree of divorce from the other and that the only objection taken on behalf of the present appellant was that the court at New York being not a court empowered to entertain application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the proceeding for divorce should be instituted in India in a court of competent jurisdiction. The proceeding for divorce instituted at New York was known to the mother of the plaintiff as would appear from her evidence. And a specific mention was made in Ext. 3, which is a correspondence from the lawyer of the respondent to the lawyer of the appellant to the effect that the respondent had been properly served with summons of the court of New York State. The mother of the plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the judgment and decree as has been admitted by her. The appellant did not contest the proceeding and allowed the same to proceed ex parte. It was open to her to plead want of jurisdiction of New York Court in the very same proceeding, which she did not prefer to contest. In the present suit, the plaintiff did not plead any fact from which it can be gathered that the foreign judgment was without jurisdiction. In the aforesaid premises the conclusion is irresistible that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to displace the presumption under Section 14 of the Civil Procedure Code that the judgment was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  1. No other ground available under Section 13 of the C.P.C. has been taken to challenge the foreign judgment in Ext. A. 1, therefore, conclude that the foreign judgment (Ext. A) conclusively dissolves the marriage between the appellant and the respondent by its judgment dated 18-1-1980.
  1. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon several decisions which enunciate the principle of domicile and grounds by proof of which a foreign judgment stands vitiated. The facts and observations of their Lordships in different cases have been quoted and relied upon at several places in the judgments of the courts below, repetition of which is unnecessary. I have already referred to the decision reported in AIR 1975 SC 105 (supra) where their Lordships have clearly stated that the validity or otherwise of a decree of divorce passed by a foreign court would largely depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. The law of this country in Sections 13 and 14 of the C.P.C., which is not merely the rules of the procedure, but rules of substantive law recognises the conclusiveness of a foreign judgment as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties. In order that the foreign judgment shall be held to be not conclusive, the plaintiff in this case could have taken any ground available under Clauses (a) to (f) of the said Section. In the absence of any plea taken by the plaintiff in the plaint and in the absence of proof of the material facts which would bring her case within the exceptions enumerated in the said section, this Court has no scope for taking a view different from that of the lower appellate court. In all the reported cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, specific facts were pleaded and proved to bring the case within the exception under Section 13 of the C.P.C. In the facts of this case and on the basis of the materials placed on record, the belated attempt of the learned counsel for the appellant to bring the case within one or the other exceptions under Section 13 of the C.P.C. must be held to be futile. I would thus confirm the judgment of the lower appellate court and dismiss this appeal.
  1. I have already stated that both parties had been intending to dissolve the marriage as they found the marriage to be incompatible. At the beginning of the hearing of this appeal, I wanted to ascertain as to the real purpose for which the appellant is pursuing the matter as the ultimate relief which she sought for in the suit has already been given by the foreign judgment. The learned counsel wanted some time for obtaining instructions from the appellant and filed a memorandum saying that the appellant had shown the foreign judgment to a Marriage Counsellor and to a lawyer in the United Kingdom, where she is now residing and she was told by them that the said foreign judgment would not be recognised in the United Kingdom. It was also stated in this memorandum that when the trial court in this suit passed a decree for divorce it was shown to the Marriage Counsellor and to a lawyer in the United Kingdom, who opined that the same would be recognised in the United Kingdom. The memorandum is however silent as to the reasons for which the foreign judgment Ext. A was not recognised in the United Kingdom. It appears from the memorandum as well as from the submissions of Mr. Patnaik that the plaintiff requires the decree for divorce for her purposes at United Kingdom, where she practically settled down for the last 12 years.
  1. On an analysis of the evidence on record, the learned trial court came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has successfully established that during her stay in U.S.A. the defendant treated the plaintiff with cruelty and deserted her. This was the ground on which the divorce was granted by the learned trial court as the trial court found that the decree of divorce granted by the Supreme Court of the State of New York in County of Albany is not valid and binding on the parties. The aforesaid finding that the plaintiff was ill treated by the respondent and that she was deserted by him though challenged in the grounds of appeal in the lower appellate court, was not dealt with at ail in the judgment of the lower appellate court, probably because the same were not seriously pressed at the hearing or for the reason that the lower appellate court did not find the necessity for the same as it held that the marital relationship stood dissolved by the foreign judgment with effect from 18-1-80. Both the parties in this case are highly educated and are well aware of the consequences of dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce. It is evident from the records of this case and fairly conceded by the counsel for both parties that all attempts for reconciliation had failed and neither of them is interested to live with the other. As a matter of fact the respondent filed an application in the Supreme Court in the State of New York for a decree of divorce and obtained one. The appellant has also instituted the suit praying for a decree of divorce out of which this appeal arises. The Hindu Marriage Act was amended in 1976 introducing a provision for divorce by mutual consent in section 13B. The said section however prescribes a procedure for the purpose. In the facts of this case, all the requirements for a divorce by mutual consent stands satisfied except that the parties have not presented a joint petition for the purpose nor any motion has been made by them after lapse of six months as provided in Sub-section (2) of the said section. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, since the sole purpose of this suit is to obtain a decree for divorce which would be recognised in the United Kingdom, I consider it more appropriate to hold that in the event the decree of divorce granted on 18-1-80 by the Supreme Court in the State of New York in County of Albany which I have held to be valid and binding on the parties is not acknowledged, the marriage between the parties would stand dissolved by virtue of this decree.
  1. In the result, this appeal is dismissed subject to the observations made in the concluding paragraph of this judgment.