The petitioner seeks to enforce a decree of divorce granted by a foreign court which is not recognised in India and it would be opposed to public policy if the said decree is afforded any recognition. It is contended that the sole ground of the petitioner hinges on averring that respondent should have obtained declaration from a competent court declaring the foreign decree as null and void. It is contended that petitioner is misleading the court inasmuch as petitioner himself made a voluntary statement before the ld.trial court that he would be filing an application under section 13 of the CPC and thereafter had moved the said application which was ultimately rejected and now the petitioner cannot turn around and contend that respondent should have approached the competent court seeking declaration offoreigndivorce decree as null and void.
cropped-29_12_2013-divorce29_s.jpg
Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that judgment of the Supreme Court in Y Narsimha Rao and ors v Y.Venkata Lakshmi (supra) is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. It is contended that foreign divorce decree was an ex parte decree wherein respondent could not contest. The said decree is not recognised in India, as such, petitioner is not entitled for any relief.
12. The Supreme Court in Y Narsimha Rao and ors v Y.Venkata Lakshmi (supra) declined to give its imprimatur to foreign decree which did not take into consideration the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act under which the parties were married. The Supreme Court while interpreting Section 13 of CPC has held that unless the respondent voluntarily and effectively submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and contested the claim which is based on the grounds available in the matrimonial law under which the parties were married, the judgment of the foreign court could not be relied upon. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court is reproduced as under:-
 It is admitted position that both the parties are Indians and marriage between them was solemnised at New Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and both are governed byHindu Marriage Act, 1955. Their marriage has been dissolved by Ilford County Court in UK on the ground of having been broken down irretrievably which is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. The Supreme Court in Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors vs. Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr (supra) has already held that foreign decree of divorce granted on a ground which is not recognized in India.
 The contention raised by the petitioner that there should be declaration from a competent court declaring the foreign decree null and void has no force as it is the petitioner who had moved an application under section 13 of CPC praying therein that the petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a foreign court thereby the marriage between the parties has been dissolved, as such, divorce petition pending before the ld.Addl. District Judge has become infructuous. Pursuant thereto reply was filed by respondent/office opposing the said application. While deciding the said application, the impugned order has been passed.
————————————————————————–
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+                    C.R.P.148/2011
%                                    Date of Decision: April 22, 2013
PRITAM ASHOK SADAPHULE                         ..... Petitioner
                Through: Mr.Rakesh Taneja, Advocate
                            versus
HIMA CHUGH                                                 .... Respondent
                            Through: Mr.Prashant Mendiratta, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
VEENA BIRBAL, J.
*
1. By this revision petition challenge has been made to order dated 22nd September, 2011 passed by the ld.Addl. District Judge-1, New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in HMA No.15/2011 whereby the application of the petitioner/husband under section 13 of the CPC has been dismissed.
2. Briefly the facts relevant for the disposal of the present petition are as under:-
The parties met each other in England in the year 2004 and developed liking for each other. On 5th March, 2005, both got married at New Delhi. After about one week of marriage, they went back to England on 12th March, 2005. With the passage of time, disputes and differences arose between them as a result of which they could not live together. In September, 2009, respondent/wife had lodged a complaint of domestic violence, cruelty and assault against the petitioner/husband in Ilford Police Station, England. It is alleged that respondent/wife also invoked the jurisdiction of UK Family Court (Brentford County Court) for Non-Molestation and Occupation order in September, 2009. Thereafter, she had come back to India in December, 2009. In March, 2010, respondent/wife lodged FIR against the petitioner/husband, his parents and family members being FIR no.46/2010 under Section 498-A/34 IPC, P.S. Tilak Nagar, Mumbai. Petitioner/husband has filed a petition for quashing of aforesaid FIR which is pending disposal before the Bombay High Court.
3. In December, 2010, petitioner/husband had filed a divorce petition before the Ilford County Court in UK for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent had misbehaved with him and that he could not reasonably be expected to live with her. It is alleged that respondent was served with the divorce petition on 19th November, 2010.
4. On 21st December, 2010, respondent/wife had filed a suit being Civil Suit (OS) No.2610/2010 before this court praying for a grant of decree of permanent injunction against the petitioner for continuing with the divorce petition before the court in UK. During the pendency of aforesaid divorce petition, respondent had filed a complaint before learned MM, Dwarka, New Delhi under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The same was dismissed on 24th December, 2010 by the concerned ld.MM, as not maintainable. Respondent filed an appeal against the said order which was dismissed vide order dated 28.3.2011.
5. The respondent/wife also filed a petition under section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act i.e. HMA No.15/2011 in February, 2011 praying for dissolution of marriage with petitioner on the ground of cruelty which is pending disposal before learned Addl. District Judge, Delhi.
6. The ld. Ilford County Court in UK had passed a Decree Nisi on 9th May, 2011 stating therein that marriage between the parties has been broken down irretrievably and ordered that the said marriage be dissolved unless sufficient cause be shown within six weeks as to why the same be not made “absolute”. A copy of the said decree was placed by the petitioner before the ld.Addl. District Judge, New Delhi on 10th June, 2011 hearing HMA 15/2011. Respondent filed a detailed representation before the Ld. Ilford County Court in UK on 15th June, 2011 opposing making the divorce decree absolute. However, the decree passed by the Ilford County Court was made „absolute‟ on 21st June, 2011. Thereafter, in July, 2011 an application under section 13 of CPC was filed by the petitioner for dropping the divorce proceedings against him on the ground that marriage between the parties has already been dissolved by a decree of divorce by Ilford County Court in U.K., as such divorce petition filed by respondent/wife has become infructuous. Reply was filed by the respondent to the aforesaid application contending therein that decree of divorce passed by the foreign court is not recognised in Indian Law. It was further stated that the ground on which the foreign court had dissolved the marriage i.e., irretrievable breakdown was no ground for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, as such, the said decree cannot be recognised in India.
7. After considering the contentions of the parties, the learned trial court relying on the judgment in Y Narashimha Rao & ors vs. Y.Venkata Lakshimi & another: (1991) 3 SCC 451, has dismissed the said application.
8. Aggrieved with the same, present petition is filed.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that respondent-wife has not obtained any declaration from a competent court declaring the foreign decree of divorce as null and void, as such, same cannot be treated as a nullity by the ld.trial court. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of this court in Harbans Lal Malik vs. Payal Malik 171 (2010) DLT 67. It is further contended that respondent was served with summons issued by the Ilford County Court on 19 th November, 2010 and she also made a representation there. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that she has not subjected herself to the jurisdiction of the said court. It is further contended that participating or not participating before the foreign court by the respondent is immaterial. The exceptions are given in Section 13 of CPC as to when a foreign judgment is not conclusive and binding. It is contended that in the present case none of the exceptions as stated therein exist.
10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that present petition is liable to be dismissed inasmuch as the petitioner seeks to enforce a decree of divorce granted by a foreign court which is not recognised in India and it would be opposed to public policy if the said decree is afforded any recognition. It is contended that the sole ground of the petitioner hinges on averring that respondent should have obtained declaration from a competent court declaring the foreign decree as null and void. It is contended that petitioner is misleading the court inasmuch as petitioner himself made a voluntary statement before the ld.trial court that he would be filing an application under section 13 of the CPC and thereafter had moved the said application which was ultimately rejected and now the petitioner cannot turn around and contend that respondent should have approached the competent court seeking declaration of foreign divorce decree as null and void.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended that judgment of the Supreme Court in Y Narsimha Rao and ors v Y.Venkata Lakshmi (supra) is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. It is contended that foreign divorce decree was an ex parte decree wherein respondent could not contest. The said decree is not recognised in India, as such, petitioner is not entitled for any relief.
12. The Supreme Court in Y Narsimha Rao and ors v Y.Venkata Lakshmi (supra) declined to give its imprimatur to foreign decree which did not take into consideration the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act under which the parties were married. The Supreme Court while interpreting Section 13 of CPC has held that unless the respondent voluntarily and effectively submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court and contested the claim which is based on the grounds available in the matrimonial law under which the parties were married, the judgment of the foreign court could not be relied upon. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court is reproduced as under:-

“12. We believe that the relevant provisions of Section 13 of the Code are capable of being interpreted to secure the required certainty in the sphere of this branch of law in conformity with public policy, justice, equity and good conscience, and the rules so evolved will protect the sanctity of the institution of marriage and the unity of family which are the corner stones of our societal life.

Clause (a) of Section 13 states that a foreign judgment shall not be recognised if it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. We are of the view that this clause should be interpreted to mean that only that court will be a court of competent jurisdiction which the Act or the law under which the parties are married recognises as a court of competent jurisdiction to entertain the matrimonial dispute. Any other court should be held to be a court without jurisdiction unless both parties voluntarily and unconditionally subject themselves to the jurisdiction of that court. The expression “competent court” in Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act has also to be construed likewise.

Clause (b) of Section 13 states that if a foreign judgment has not been given on the merits of the case, the courts in this country will not recognise such judgment. This clause should be interpreted to mean (a) that the decision of the foreign court should be on a ground available under the law under which the parties are married, and (b) that the decision should be a result of the contest between the parties. The latter requirement is fulfilled only when the respondent is duly served and voluntarily and unconditionally submits himself/herself to the jurisdiction of the court and contests the claim, or agrees to the passing of the decree with or without appearance. A mere filing of the reply to the claim under protest and without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, or an appearance in the Court either in person or through a representative for objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, should not be considered as a decision on the merits of the case. In this respect the general rules of the acquiscence to the jurisdiction of the Court which may be valid in other matters and areas should be ignored and deemed inappropriate.

The second part of Clause (c) of Section 13 states that where the judgment is founded on a refusal to recognise the law of this country in cases in which such law is applicable, the judgment will not be recognised by the courts in this country. The marriages which take place in this country can only be under either the customary or the statutory law in force in this country. Hence, the only law that can be applicable to the matrimonial disputes is the cine under which the parties are married, and no other law. When, therefore, a foreign judgment is founded on a jurisdiction or on a ground not recognised by such law, it is a judgment which is in defiance of the Law. Hence, it is not conclusive of the matters adjudicated therein and, therefore, unenforceable in this country. For the same reason, such a judgment will also be unenforceable under Clause (f) of Section 13, since such a judgment would obviously be in breach of the matrimonial law in force in this country.

Clause (d) of Section 13 which makes a foreign judgment unenforceable on the ground that the proceedings in which it is obtained are opposed to natural justice, states no more than an elementary principle on which any civilised system of justice rests. However, in matters concerning the family law such as the matrimonial disputes, this principle has to be extended to mean something more than mere compliance with the technical rules of procedure. If the rule of audi alteram partem has any meaning with reference to the proceedings in a foreign court, for the purposes of the rule it should not be deemed sufficient that the respondent has been duly served with the process of the court. It is necessary to ascertain whether the respondent was in a position to present or represent himself/herself and contest effectively the said proceedings. This requirement should apply equally to the appellate proceedings if and when they are filed by either party. If the foreign court has not ascertained and ensured such effective contest by requiring the petitioner to make all necessary provisions for the respondent to defend including the costs of travel, residence and litigation where necessary, it should be held that the proceedings are in breach of the principles of natural justice. It is for this reason that we find that the rules of Private International Law of some countries insist, even in commercial matters that the action should be filed in the forum where the defendant is either domiciled or is habitually resident. It is only in special cases which is called special jurisdiction where the claim has some real link with other forum that a judgment of such forum is recognised. This jurisdiction principle is also recognised by the Judgments Convention of this European Community. If, therefore, the courts in this country also insist as a matter of rule that foreign matrimonial judgment will be recognised only if it is of the forum where the respondent is domiciled or habitually and permanently resides, the provisions of Clause (d) may be held to have been satisfied.

The provision of Clause (e) of Section 13 which requires that the courts in this country will nor recognise a foreign judgment if it has been obtained by fraud, is self-evident. However, in view of the decision of this Court in Smt. Satya v. Teja Singh (supra) it must be understood that the fraud need not be only in relation to the merits of the matter but may also be in relation to jurisdictional facts.

13. From the aforesaid discussion the following rule can be deduced for recognising foreign matrimonial judgment in this country. The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as well as the ground on which the relief is granted must be in accordance with the matrimonial law under which the parties are married. The exceptions to this rule may Le as follows: (i) where the matrimonial action is filed in the forum where the respondent is domiciled 01 habitually and permanently resides and the relief is granted on a ground available in the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (ii) where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submits to the jurisdiction of the forum as discussed above and contests the claim which is based on a ground available under the matrimonial law under which the parties are married; (iii) where the respondent consents to the grant of the relief although the jurisdiction of the forum is not in accordance with the provisions of the matrimonial law of the parties.

The aforesaid rule with its stated exceptions has the merit of being just and equitable. It does no injustice to any of the parties. The parties do and ought to know their rights and obligations when they marry under a particular law. They cannot be heard to make a grievance about it later or allowed to bypass it by subterfuges as in the present case. The rule also has an advantage of rescuing the institution of marriage from the uncertain maze of the rules of the Private international Law of the different countries with regard to jurisdiction and merits based variously on domicile, nationality, residence-permanent or temporary or ad hoc forum, proper law etc. and ensuring certainly in the most vital field of national life and conformity with pubic policy. The rule further takes account of the needs of modern life and makes due allowance to accommodate them. Above all, it gives protection to women, the most vulnerablesection of our society, whatever the strata to which they may belong. In particular it frees them from the bondage of the tyrannical and servile rule that wife’s domicile follows that of her husband and that it is the husband’s domiciliary law which determines the jurisdiction and judges the merits of the case.”

13. It is admitted position that both the parties are Indians and marriage between them was solemnised at New Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and both are governed byHindu Marriage Act, 1955. Their marriage has been dissolved by Ilford County Court in UK on the ground of having been broken down irretrievably which is not a ground for divorce under theHindu Marriage Act. The Supreme Court in Y.Narasimha Rao and Ors vs. Y.Venkata Lakshmi and Anr (supra) has already held that foreign decree of divorce granted on a ground which is not recognized in India.
14. The contention raised by the petitioner that there should be declaration from a competent court declaring the foreign decree null and void has no force as it is the petitioner who had moved an application under section 13 of CPC praying therein that the petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a foreign court thereby the marriage between the parties has been dissolved, as such, divorce petition pending before the ld.Addl. District Judge has become infructuous. Pursuant thereto reply was filed by respondent/office opposing the said application. While deciding the said application, the impugned order has been passed.
15. Further the divorce granted by the Ilford County Court in UK is an ex parte divorce decree. Respondent never submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the said court. Respondent lodged a representation dated 15.6.2011 before the Ilford County Court informing that she was in India when the divorce petition was filed. She also informed that she was in acute financial difficulty to come to London to contest the divorce case. She wrote in detail about her financial condition and also informed that she had already filed a divorce petition in India. She requested the Ilford County Court not to make the divorce decree “absolute”. Respondent also filed CS(OS)2610/2010 before this court praying for grant of a decree of permanent injunction against the petitioner from continuing with the divorce petition before the court in UK. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that she had submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
16. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of Harbans Lal Malik vs. Payal Malik (supra), is of no help to him. The facts of the said case are entirely different. The learned trial court has also considered the judgment of this court in Harmeeta Singh vs. Rajat Taneja reported in I(2003) DMC 443 and Mrs.Veena Kalia vs. Dr.Jatinder Nath Kalia and anr reported as 59(1995) Delhi Law times 635 in coming to the conclusion that decree of dissolution of marriage granted by the Ilford County Court, Essex, UK cannot be recognised as the facts of the case fall within the purview of the exceptions of Section 13 of CPC.
In view of the above discussion, no illegality is seen in the impugned order which calls for interference of this court. Petition is dismissed.
VEENA BIRBAL, J APRIL

Rajya Sabha passes bill, wife to get share from husband’s inherited property after divorce.

The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill seeks to empower the courts to decide the compensation amount from the husband’s inherited and inheritable property for the wife and children once the marriage legally ends.

The Bill allows both parties to file for divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown” of marriage. Both parties have to live apart for at least three years before filing for such a petition.

Provisions have been made to restrict grant of a decree of divorce on ground of “irretrievable breakdown” of marriage if the court is satisfied that adequate provision for maintenance of children has not been made consistently with financial capacity of the parties to the marriage.

Also, the wife has the right to oppose the grant of a divorce on the ground that the dissolution could result in grave financial hardship.

While the bill has a provision for share in a husband’s self-acquired property, a new clause, 13F, was discussed by the GoM, headed by defence minister A K Antony.

“As per new Divorce law, Wife share in property would be 50% in all her husband’s residential properties, no matter what and in other properties, her share will be decided as per the court decision.”
Wife share in property owned by husband would be 50%
Earlier, before this change – a woman was entitled for a share in husband’s properties, but there was no quantum defined as per law, it would be any percentage depending on the case, but now with this suggested change, women will enjoy equal sharing without any condition in all the residential properties owned by husband. But in this case, women will have to specifically apply for her share, she should be aware about this law about “50% share”.

A major change in this amendment is that this rule is applicable to all the properties of the husband acquired before and after the marriage, whereas as the earlier law made sure that the wife gets share only in those properties which are acquired by husband only after marriage. Now men stand to lose on these front, in-case things go sour with wife.

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 also provide for settlement of property jointly owned by both parties which they were presented to them at the time of marriage.

The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 provides for one share of the self acquired property of the husband to the wife as his widow that is after his death not during his lifetime and this too with a condition that the Hindu husband dies intestate that is without leaving a Will.

The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 also provides for the Hindu wife to claim monthly maintenance from her husband if she has no source of income for herself to maintain herself.

Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for monthly maintenance to wives (irrespective of their religion) from their husband if they have no source of income or mean to maintain themselves.

The Wife can seek not only right to monthly maintenance against the husband but even enforce her right to residence against him under the Protection of women from domestic violence Act,2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5511-5512 OF 2014
VINOD KUMAR SUBBIAH
.…..APPELLANTS

Versus

SARASWATHI PALANIAPPAN …..RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.

1 These Appeals assail the Judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai, delivered on
13.3.2013, setting aside the Judgment dated 25.8.2011 of the Trial Court.
The Impugned Judgment dismissed the divorce petition filed by the
Appellant.

2 The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved
to the U.S. on 9.7.2004. They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June
2006. During the latter visit, the Respondent was three months pregnant and
left for her parental home in Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to
a male child on 5.12.2006. The Appellant subsequently filed for divorce
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act on 30.4.2007.

3 The case put forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was
verbally abusive; she would insult his family; she would threaten to lodge
false police complaints; and she would threaten to commit suicide placing
the blame on the Appellant and his family. After she left for her parental
home in June 2006, the Appellant attempted to bring her back to her
matrimonial home but she refused. The Appellant claims that he has been put
through intolerable mental agony and can no longer continue to be married
to the Respondent.

4 The Respondent denied these allegations and claimed that she and the
Appellant lived happily in the U.S., and she only went to her parental home
in June 2006 for her child to be born there. She has pleaded that she
returned to Chennai with her child from March to April 2007, that the
divorce petition was completely unexpected and was the result of a
misunderstanding between her family and that of the Appellant. She
subsequently filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights under
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, praying that the Appellant be directed
to take her back to her conjugal home, which she pleaded is in the U.S.
She alleged that her husband is living a wayward life, that her father-in-
law misbehaved with her, and that her parents-in-law were negligent with
her infant child and asked her to leave the house when she questioned them
about this. She also filed a maintenance petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs per
month as maintenance.

5 The Trial Court heard all three petitions together and examined the
evidence submitted by the parties at length. The Appellant has deposed that
when his sister came to the U.S., she initially stayed with him and the
Respondent. However, the Respondent did not like having her in the house,
so she locked the Respondent and his sister out of the house, was abusive
towards them and told them that they belonged to a “prostitute family”.
Eventually the Appellant’s sister was constrained to stay at a Lodge. The
Respondent claimed that the dispute was because her sister-in-law tried to
make her join her diamond business, which she did not want to do. The Trial
Court found no truth in the argument of the Respondent, in light of the
fact that she has no background or knowledge of the diamond business.
Furthermore, the Appellant has deposed that when his brother came to the
U.S. to study, he also initially stayed at the Appellant’s house. However,
it is in evidence that the Respondent called the Appellant at work alleging
that his brother was knocking on her door, thus implying that he was
behaving in an untoward manner. She abused the Appellant and his family in
the presence of his brother and threatened to file a police complaint. The
Appellant has deposed that he was forced to make his brother stay
elsewhere. In a subsequent event, the Appellant informed the Respondent
that his parents would be coming to the U.S. The Respondent was verbally
and physically abusive, and called the police alleging domestic violence.
The Appellant was given a warning by the Police. The Respondent claimed
that the incident took place because the Appellant was having an affair
with a woman named Solai. She claimed that he took her to Solai’s house
that evening and then wanted to go back at night, which is why she called
the police. The Trial Court has justifiably highlighted that summoning the
police was serious because the Appellant was in a foreign country and
didn’t know the laws and procedure. Further, the allegation that he was
having an affair was not accepted, as it was unbelievable that the
Respondent had previously not told anyone about Solai and further that it
never came up du ring the attempted compromise between the families of the
two parties. The Respondent claimed that after having the child, she came
to live with the Appellant, which the Appellant denied. The Respondent also
alleged that while she was living with the Appellant’s family, his parents
took the child who was only three months old away for six hours. By the
time they brought him back, he was unconscious due to starvation. When the
Respondent questioned them about this, they asked her to leave the house
with the child, even though it was late in the night. The Trial Court found
this allegation entirely unbelievable. Her allegation that the father of
the Appellant started misbehaving with her and went to the extent of
pulling her hands was also found to be false. The Trial Court also took
into consideration the voice mails and emails from the Respondent to the
Appellant, which were not treated as the main evidence but as evidence
intended to substantiate the oral evidence. It was held that the evidence
and the submissions of the Respondent indicate that she was unwilling to
live in the Appellant’s house in Chennai, and that she wanted him to leave
his family in India and live in the U.S. with her. It is pertinent to note
that the Appellant had lost his job in the U.S. and was unemployed and
consequently had to set up residence in Chennai. In light of these
circumstances, it was found that the Respondent is not entitled to conjugal
rights. An order of dissolution of marriage was passed and maintenance was
fixed at Rs. 25,000 per month.

6 The High Court, however, held that the Appellant’s allegations in his
divorce petition were no more than “the ordinary wear and tear” that takes
place in a marriage. It observed that the Appellant did not give details of
the events of abuse by the Respondent towards his family or the cruelty
that was meted out to him in the U.S. in his main petition or his
subsequent counter affidavits. It was only after filing the petition that
the Appellant had produced copies of the abusive voicemails and emails he
received from the Respondent. The High Court noted that the Trial Court did
not need to strictly adhere to hard and fast rules while entertaining
evidence, but nevertheless held that the Trial Court had acted in haste in
allowing the Appellant’s allegations. The High Court found that the Trial
Court, instead of considering whether the Appellant had established cruelty
by adducing evidence, took certain answers from the Respondent’s Chief
examination and cross-examination out of context and held that a case of
cruelty was made out. The High Court stated that in a matrimonial
relationship, parties must be prepared to subject themselves to the normal
wear and tear of life, and that the situation at hand was no more than
that. The divorce petition was thus dismissed and the petition for
restitution of conjugal rights was allowed.

7 We have carefully considered the matter, and find that we are unable
to uphold the conclusions of the High Court. The Appellant had duly pleaded
instances of mental cruelty which he proved in evidence and documents. An
examination of the divorce petition makes it abundantly clear that various
allegations of cruelty were made out and a number of incidents were
mentioned therein. Further evidence was submitted during the course of the
Trial to substantiate these allegations, which is in keeping with Order VI
Rule 2 of the CPC. Furthermore, we find that the Trial Court examined the
evidence at great length and came to the reasoned conclusion that the
actions of the Respondent amounted to cruelty. If a spouse abuses the other
as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed as “wear and tear”
of family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot
also be similarly viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives to
visit or reside in the matrimonial home would also indubitably result in
cruelty to the other spouse. After a cursory discussion of the evidence
which the Trial Court had discussed threadbare, the High Court was not
justified to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court
without giving substantiated reasons.

8 We thus allow these Appeals and set aside the Impugned Order, but
desist from imposing costs. The Trial Court’s decision granting
dissolution of the marriage between the parties is hereby restored.

9 We allow the Respondent’s Application for disbursement of the amount
deposited by the Appellant towards her legal expenses in pursuance of the
Order dated 4.7.2013.

………………………………………….J.
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN]
……………………………………………J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
April 24, 2015.

 

Sec.3. Definition of domestic violence.–

download (1)

For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it

harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse,sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or

harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other or property valuable security; or

has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or

otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Domestic violence occurs in many forms – physical, emotional, sexual, economic, verbal and others, and a woman may face violence in any one, two or in combination of all of them Domestic violence law and the term “domestic violence” usually refers to crimes involving domestic abuse, such as child abuse and child neglect, spousal abuse or domestic-partner abuse, and elder abuse. Domestic abuse isn’t just physical; it also covers the threats, emotional abuse, harassment, and stalking that a spouse, partner, or date uses to control someone else’s behavior. The abuse can be directed against anyone: children, former partners, roommates, and parents, but it is most typically directed against women.

The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005

(1) An aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this Act:

Provided that before passing any order on such application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any domestic incident report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.

(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an order for payment of compensation or damages without prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent:

Provided that where a decree for any amount as compensation or damages has been passed by any court in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid or payable in pursuance of the order made by the Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the amount payable under such decree and the decree shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if any, left after such set off.

(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.

(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt of the application by the court.

(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.

Section 27. Divorce

special marriage

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the District Court either by the husband or the wife on the ground that the respondent-
(a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or
(b) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately proceeding the presentation of the petition; or
(c) is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for seven years or more for an offence as defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); or
(d) has since the solemnization of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty; or
(e) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind, and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

Explanation- In this Clause-
(a) the expression “mental disorder” means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia;
(b) the expression “psychopathic disorder” means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the respondent and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or
(f) has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or
(g) has been suffering from leprosy, the disease not having been contracted from the petitioner; or
(h) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of the respondent if the respondent had been alive;
Explanation- In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

(1-A) A wife may also present a petitioner for divorce to the District Court on the ground.-

(i) that her husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality;

(ii) that in a suit under Sec. 18 of the Hindus Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or under the corresponding Sec. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards.

(2) Subject to the provisions of the Act and to the Rules made thereunder, either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of the Special Marriage (Amendment) Act, 1970, may present a petition for divorce to the District Court on the ground-

(i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or

(ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.

27-A. Alternate relief in divorce proceedings- In any proceeding under this Act, on a petition for a dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, except in so far as the petition is founded on the ground mentioned in Cl. (h) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 27, the Court may, if it considers it just so to do, having regard to the circumstances of the case, pass instead a decree for judicial separation.

 

Section 28. Divorce by mutual consent under Special Marriage Act 1954.

mutual divorce

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and to the rules made thereunder, a petition for divorce may be presented to the District Court by both the parties together on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date of the presentation of the petition referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the District Court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized under this Act and that the avertments in the petition are true, pass a decree declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree

 

 Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

 

An Act to amend and codify certain cropped-family-law-banner.jpgparts of the law relating to minority and guardianship among Hindus. BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventh Year of the Republic of India as follows:-

1 . Short title and extent.– (1) This Act may be called the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu Kashmir and applies to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories.

2 . Act to be supplemental to Act 8 of 1890.- The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not, save as hereinafter expressly provided, in derogation of, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890).

3 . Application of Act.– (1) This Act applies- (a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. (b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and (c) to any person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.

Explanation.– The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be:- (i) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion; (ii) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhists, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and (iii) any person who is convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.
(3) The expression ‘Hindu’ in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is nevertheless, a person to whom this Act, applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section.

4 . Definitions.- In this Act,- (a) “minor” means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years; (b) “major” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes- (i) a natural guardian, (ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor’s father or mother, (iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and (iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any court of wards; (c) “natural guardian” means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6

. 5 . Over-riding effect of Act.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act,- (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act; (b) any other law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act

. 6 . Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.- The natural guardians of a Hindu, minor, in respect of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are- (a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl-the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother; (b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl-the mother, and after her, the father; (c) in the case of a married girl-the husband; Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section- (a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or
(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi) Explanation.- In this section, the expressions ‘father’ and ‘mother’ do not include a step-father and a step-mother.

7 . Natural guardianship of adopted son.- The natural guardianship of an adopted son who is a minor passes, on adoption, to the adoptive father and after him to the adoptive mother. 8 . Powers of natural guardian.- (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant.

(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,- (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.

(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. (4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor

. (5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the court under section 29 of that Act, and in particular- (a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof. (b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and (c) an appeal lie from an order of the court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that court. (6) In this section, “Court” means the city civil court or a district court or a court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), within the
local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate.

9 . Testamentary guardians and their powers.– (1) A Hindu father entitled to act as the natural guardian of his minor legitimate children may, by will appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor’s person or in respect of the minor’s property (other than the undivided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (2) An appointment made under sub-section (1) shall have not effect if the father predeceases the mother, but shall revive if the mother dies without appointing, by will, any person as guardian. (3) A Hindu widow entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate children, and a Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor legitimate children by reason of the fact that the father has become disentitled to act as such, may, by will, appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor’s person or in respect of the minor’s property (other than the undivided interest referred to in section 12) or in respect of both. (4) A Hindu mother entitled to act as the natural guardian of her minor illegitimate children may; by will appoint a guardian for any of them in respect of the minor’s person or in respect of the minor’s property or in respect of both. (5) The guardian so appointed by will has the right to act as the minor’s guardian after the death of the minor’s father or mother, as the case may be, and to exercise all the rights of a natural guardian under this Act to such extent and subject to such restrictions, if any, as are specified in this Act and in the will. (6) The right of the guardian so appointed by will shall, where the minor is a girl, cease on her marriage.

10 . Incapacity of minor to act as guardian of property.- A minor shall be incompetent to act as guardian of the property of any minor. 11 . De facto guardian not to deal with minors property.- After the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor.

12 . Guardian not to be appointed for minors undivided interest in joint family property.– Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration.
13 . Welfare of minor to be paramount consideration.- (1) In the appointment of declaration of any person as guardian of a Hindu minor by a court, the welfare of the minor shall be the paramount consideration. (2) No person shall be entitled to the guardianship by virtue of the provisions of this Act or of any law relating to guardianship in marriage among Hindus, if the court is of opinion that his or her guardianship will not be for the welfare of the minor.

ex-parte divorce granted by Foreign Court Invalid: Delhi High Court.

The Delhi high court has held that divorce granted by a foreign court on the ground of “irretrievable break down of marriage” is not valid in India.

The court said this was because the Hindu Marriage Act did not recognize this ground valid for dissolution of marriage.

“Both the parties are Indians and marriage between them was solemnised at New Delhi according to Hindu rites and both are governed by the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA). Their marriage has been dissolved by a court in UK on the ground of having been broken down irretrievably which is not a ground for divorce under the HMA…” Justice Veena Birbal said citing a supreme court judgment.

The court said this while rejecting the plea of an Indian-origin UK resident to drop the divorce proceedings initiated by his wife in Delhi on the ground that he had already secured a divorce decree from a UK court in 2011.

From the records the judge found that the UK court’s was an ex-parte decree (without hearing the wife) and she had not submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

“She also informed that she was in acute financial difficulty to come to London to contest the divorce case. She wrote in detail about her financial condition and also informed that she had already filed a divorce petition in India. She requested the UK court not to make the divorce decree ‘absolute’…… In these circumstances, it cannot be said that she had submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court,” the court said.

They couple fell in love after meeting each other in UK in 2004 and got married in Delhi in March 2005. With the passage of time, disputes arose between them as a result of which they could not live together.

She came back to Delhi in 2009 and filed a divorce petition in a court here leveling charges of  domestic violence, cruelty and assault against her husband.

Thanks to Hindustan Times for this articles and resources:

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Divorce-in-foreign-court-over-irretrievable-break-down-not-valid-in-India-Delhi-HC/Article1-1049816.aspx

 

Divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

“Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law pertaining to mental cruelty, it is to be scrutinized whether in the case at hand, there has been real mental cruelty or not, but, a significant one, the said scrutiny can only be done if the findings are perverse, unreasonable, against the material record or based on non-consideration of relevant materials. We may note here that the High Court has, in a singular line, declined to interfere with the judgment and decree of the courts below stating that they are based on concurrent findings of fact. The plea of perversity of approach though raised was not adverted to.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4905 OF 2012

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 16528 of 2007)

Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal …..……..Appellant

Versus

Sau. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal ………Respondent

J U D G M E N T

DIPAK MISRA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on the 30th of April, 1979 as per the Hindu rites at Akola. In the wedlock, two sons, namely, Vishal and Rahul, were born on 23.9.1982 and 1.11.1984 respectively. As the appellant-husband felt that there was total discord in their marital life and compatibility looked like a mirage, he filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1) (ia) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity ‘the Act’).

3. It was the case of the appellant before the court of first instance that the respondent-wife did not know how to conduct herself as a wife and daughter-in-law and despite persuasion, her behavioural pattern remained unchanged. The birth of the children had no impact on her conduct and everything worsened with the efflux of time. The behaviour of the respondent with the relatives and guests who used to come to their house was far from being desirable and, in fact, it exhibited arrogance and lack of culture and, in a way, endangered the social reputation of the family. That apart, she did not have the slightest respect for her mother-in-law. Despite the old lady being a patient of diabetes and hyper tension, it could not invoke any sympathy from the respondent and hence, there was total absence of care or concern.

4. As pleaded, in the month of March, 1990, there was a dacoity in the house where the appellant was staying and, therefore, they shifted to the ginning factory and eventually, on 17.3.1991, shifted to their own three storeyed building situate in Gandhi Chowk. Even with the passage of time, instead of bringing maturity in the attitude of the respondent, it brought a sense of established selfishness and non-concern for the children. Whim and irrationality reigned in her day-to-day behaviour and frequent quarrels became a daily affair. As misfortune would have it, on 23.1.1994, the mother of the appellant died and the freer atmosphere at home gave immense independence to the respondent to make the life of the appellant more troublesome. The appellant and his father were compelled to do their personal work as the entire attention of the servants was diverted in a compulsive manner towards her. Her immature perception of life reached its zenith when on certain occasions she used to hide the keys of the motorcycle and close the gate so that the appellant could not go to the office of the factory to look after the business. Frequent phone calls were made to the factory solely for the purpose of abusing and causing mental agony to the appellant. As asserted, the appellant and his sons used to sleep on the second floor whereas the respondent used to sleep in the bedroom on the third floor and their relationship slowly but constantly got estranged. As the cruelty became intolerable, the appellant visited his in-laws and disclosed the same but it had no effect on her behaviour. Eventually, on 1.5.1995, the respondent was left at the house of her parents at Akola and the appellant stayed in his house with the two sons. As the factual matrix would unveil, on 24.7.1995, a notice issued by her advocate was published in the daily “Lokmat” stating, inter alia, that the appellant is a womaniser and addicted to liquor. On 11.10.1995, at 4.00 p.m., the respondent came to the house of the appellant at Gandhi Chowk and abused the father, the children and the appellant. She, in fact, created a violent atmosphere in the house as well as in the office by damaging the property and causing mental torture to the appellant and also to the family members which compelled the appellant to lodge a complaint at the Police Station, Chopda. It was alleged that she had brought gundas and certain women to cause that incident. The said untoward incident brought the A.S.P., Jalgaon, to the spot. The publication in the newspaper and the later incident both occurred during the pendency of the divorce petition and they were incorporated by way of amendment. On the aforesaid basis, it was contended that the respondent had treated the appellant with cruelty and hence, he was entitled to a decree for divorce.

5. The asseverations made in the petition were controverted by the respondent stating that she was always respectful and cordial to her in- laws, relatives and the guests as was expected from a cultured daughter-in- law. They led a happy married life for 16 years and at no point of time she showed any arrogance or any behaviour which could remotely suggest any kind of cruelty. She attended to her mother-in-law all the time with a sense of committed service and at no point of time there was any dissatisfaction on her part. She disputed the allegation that she had hidden the keys of the motorcycle or closed the gate or repeatedly called the appellant on phone at the office to abuse him or to disturb him in his work. It is her stand that the appellant owns an oil mill, ginning factory and a petrol pump at Chopda and had sold certain non-agricultural land by demarcating it into small plots. The appellant, as alleged, joined the computer classes which were run by one Neeta Gujarathi in the name and style of “Om Computer Services” and gradually the appellant started spending much of his time at the computer centre instead of attending to his own business in the factory. When the respondent became aware of the intimacy, she took serious objection to the same and therefrom their relationship became bitter.

6. It was alleged by the respondent that she was disturbed after knowing about the involvement of the appellant with another lady despite having an established family life and two adolescent sons and, therefore, she was compelled to make phone calls to make enquiries about his whereabouts. As the interference by the respondent was not appreciated by the appellant, he took the respondent on 1.5.1995 to Akola and left her at her parental house and never cared to bring her back to her matrimonial home. Her willingness to come back and stay with the husband and children could not get fructified because of the totally indifferent attitude shown by the appellant. Her attempts to see the children in the school became an exercise in futility, as the husband, who is a trustee of the school, managed to ensure that the boys did not meet her. It was further alleged that the said Neeta lived with him as his mistress and when the respondent came to know about it, she went to Chopda to ascertain the same and coming to know that Neeta was in the house of the appellant, she made an effort to enter into the house but she was assaulted. This resulted in gathering of people of the locality and the appellant-husband, as a counter-blast, lodged a complaint at the police station. The Deputy Superintendent of Police arrived at the scene and found that Neeta was inside the house and thereafter she was taken back to her house by the police. Because of the involvement of the appellant with the said Neeta, he had concocted the story of cruelty and filed the petition for divorce.

7. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues. The two vital issues were whether the appellant had been able to prove the alleged cruelty and whether he was entitled to take disadvantage of his own wrong. The appellant, in order to prove the allegation of cruelty, examined ten witnesses and on behalf of the respondent, eight witnesses were examined. The learned trial Judge, analysing the evidence on record, came to hold that there was conjugal relationship till 1.5.1995; that there was no substantial material on record to demonstrate that the respondent had behaved with immaturity immediately after marriage; that in the absence of cogent evidence, it was difficult to hold that the respondent had troubled the husband and his parents; that the evidence of PW-3, Ramesh, was not worthy of acceptance as he is close and an interested witness; that the allegation that whenever she used to go to her parental home, she was granting leave to the servants was not acceptable; that the appellant should have examined some of the servants including the maid servant but for some reason or other had withheld the best evidence; that the plea that the respondent was not looking after her mother-in-law who was suffering from paralysis from 1984 has not been proven; that the allegation that the respondent was hiding the uniforms of the children and not treating them well had not been proven because the version of Vishal could not be accepted as he was staying with the father and, therefore, it was natural for him to speak in favour of the father; that the stand that the respondent was hiding the keys of the motorcycle and crumpling the ironed clothes of the appellant did not constitute mental cruelty as the said acts, being childish, were enjoyed by the appellant-husband; that the factum of abuse by the respondent on telephone had not been established by adducing reliable evidence; that the respondent and the appellant were sleeping on the third floor of the house and hence, she was sleeping with him in the bedroom and the allegation that he was deprived of sexual satisfaction from 1991 was unacceptable; that from the witnesses cited on behalf of the respondent, it was demonstrable that her behaviour towards her sons and in-laws was extremely good; that even if the allegations made by the appellant were accepted to have been established to some extent, it could only be considered as normal wear and tear of the marital life; that the plea of mental cruelty had not been proven as none of the allegations had been established by adducing acceptable, consistent and cogent evidence; that the notice published in the daily “Lokmat” on 28.7.1995 and the later incident dated 11.10.1995 being incidents subsequent to the filing of the petition for divorce, the same were not to be taken into consideration.

8. The learned trial Judge further returned the finding that the appellant was going to learn computer and taking instructions from Neeta Gujarathi and the plea that she was engaged as a Computer Operator in his office was not believable as no appointment letter was produced; that the stand that she was paid Rs.1200/- per month was not worthy of any credence as she was operating a computer centre; that from the evidence of the witnesses of the respondent, namely, RW-3 to RW-5, it was clear that Neeta Gujarathi was living with the appellant in his house and he had developed intimacy with her and, therefore, the subsequent events, even if analysed, were to be so done on the said backdrop; that the allegation that there was a gathering and they were violent and broke the windows was really not proven by adducing credible evidence; that the testimony of the witnesses of the respondent clearly reveal that Neeta was inside the house of the appellant and effort was made to bring her out from the house and no damage was caused to the property; that on that day, the police had come in the mid night hours and taken out Neeta from the house of the appellant and left her at her house; that the notice which was published in “Lokmat” was to protect the interest of the sons in the property and basically pertained to the appellant’s alienating the property; that the public notice was not unfounded or baseless and the question of defaming him and thereby causing any mental cruelty did not arise; that the allegations made in the application for grant of interim alimony that the appellant is a womaniser and is addicted to liquor cannot be considered for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that the husband was meted with cruelty; that the allegations made in the written statement having been found to be truthful, the same could not be said to have caused any mental cruelty; that the cumulative effect of the evidence brought on record was that no mental cruelty was ever caused by the respondent; and that the husband could not take advantage of his own wrong. Being of this view, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application with costs and also dismissed the application of the respondent-wife for grant of permanent alimony.

9. Grieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant-husband preferred Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1999. The first appellate court appreciated the evidence, dealt with the findings returned by the trial court and eventually came to hold that the cumulative effect of the evidence and the material brought on record would go a long way to show that the appellant had failed to make out a case of mental cruelty to entitle him to obtain a decree for divorce. The aforesaid conclusion by the appellate court entailed dismissal of the appeal.

10. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Judge, the husband preferred Second Appeal No. 683 of 2006 before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court came to hold that there were concurrent findings of fact and no substantial question of law was involved. However, the learned single Judge observed that the sons of the parties had grown up and have been married; that the parties had no intention to patch up the matrimonial discord; and that the marriage had been irretrievably broken but that could not be considered by the High Court but only by the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Expressing the aforesaid view, he did not admit the appeal and dismissed the same.

11. We have heard Mr. Arvind V. Sawant, learned senior counsel for the appellant-husband, and Mr. Vivek C. Solshe, learned counsel for the respondent-wife.

12. At the very outset, we would like to make it clear that though the learned single Judge of the High Court has expressed the view that the parties are at logger heads and have shown no inclination to patch the matrimonial rupture and the sons have grown up and got married and with the efflux of time, the relationship has been further shattered and hence, the marriage is irretrievably broken and only this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution, yet we are not going to take recourse to the same and only address ourselves whether a case for divorce has really been made out.

13. At this juncture, we may note with profit that the learned senior counsel for the appellant exclusively rested his case on the foundation of mental cruelty. It is his submission that if the evidence of the husband and other witnesses are scrutinized in an apposite manner along with the stand and stance taken in the written statement, it will clearly reveal a case of mental cruelty regard being had to the social status of the appellant. It is urged by him that the trial court as well as the appellate court have not given any credence to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they are interested witnesses though they are the most natural witnesses who had witnessed the cruel behaviour meted to the appellant.

14. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the court of first instance as well as the appellate court have failed to take into consideration certain material aspects of the evidence and the appreciation of evidence being absolutely perverse, the High Court would have been well advised to scan and scrutinize the same but it declined to admit the appeal on the ground that there are concurrent findings of fact. It is canvassed by him that this Court, in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution, can dislodge such concurrent findings of facts which are perverse, baseless, unreasonable and contrary to the material on record.

15. The learned counsel for the respondent, resisting the aforesaid submissions, contended that the view expressed by the High Court cannot be found fault with as the courts below have, at great length, discussed the evidence and appreciated the same with utmost prudence and objectivity and there is nothing on record to show that any material part of the evidence has been ignored or something extraneous to the record has been taken into consideration. It is highlighted by him that the stand put forth by the wife in her written statement having been established, the same cannot be construed to have constituted mental cruelty. Lastly, it is put forth that the appellant has created a dent in the institution of marriage and made a maladroit effort to take advantage of his own wrong which should not be allowed.

16. First, we shall advert to what actually constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ and whether in the case at hand, the plea of mental cruelty has been established and thereafter proceed to address whether the courts below have adopted an approach which is perverse, unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence on record and totally unacceptable to invite the discretion of this Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution to dislodge the same.

17. The expression ‘cruelty’ has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status. In Sirajmohamedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Hafizunnisa Yasinkhan and another[1], a two-Judge Bench approved the concept of legal cruelty as expounded in Sm. Pancho v. Ram Prasad[2] wherein it was stated thus: –

“Conception of legal cruelty undergoes changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. With the advancement of our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative recognition that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and separate maintenance. Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used.

Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste are all factors which may undermine the health of a wife.”

It is apt to note here that the said observations were made while dealing with the Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act (19 of 1946). This Court, after reproducing the passage, has observed that the learned Judge has put his finger on the correct aspect and object of mental cruelty.

18. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi[3], while dealing with ‘cruelty’ under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, this Court observed that the said provision does not define ‘cruelty’ and the same could not be defined. The ‘cruelty’ may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: –

“First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second, the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted.”

19. After so stating, this Court observed about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that when a spouse makes a complaint about treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. Their Lordships referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon[4] wherein Lord Denning stated, “the categories of cruelty are not closed”. Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus: –

“Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.

These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord Ried observed in Gollins v. Gollins[5] :

In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with

objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or this woman.”

20. In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.)[6], a two-Judge Bench referred to the amendment that had taken place in Sections 10 and 13(1)(ia) after the Hindu Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 and proceeded to hold that the earlier requirement that such cruelty has caused a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with the other one is no longer the requirement. Thereafter, this Court proceeded to deal with what constitutes mental cruelty as contemplated in Section 13(1)(ia) and observed that mental cruelty in the said provision can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. To put it differently, the mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It was further observed, while arriving at such conclusion, that regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case and it has to be determined in each case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that case. That apart, the accusations and allegations have to be scrutinized in the context in which they are made. Be it noted, in the said case, this Court quoted extensively from the allegations made in the written statement and the evidence brought on record and came to hold that the said allegations and counter allegations were not in the realm of ordinary plea of defence and did amount to mental cruelty.

21. In Praveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta[7], it has been held that mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one of the spouses due to behaviour or behavioural pattern by the other. Mental cruelty cannot be established by direct evidence and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. A feeling of anguish, disappointment, and frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of matrimonial life have been living. The facts and circumstances are to be assessed emerging from the evidence on record and thereafter, a fair inference has to be drawn whether the petitioner in the divorce petition has been subjected to mental cruelty due to the conduct of the other.

22. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate[8], it has been opined that a conscious and deliberate statement levelled with pungency and that too placed on record, through the written statement, cannot be so lightly ignored or brushed aside.

23. In A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur[9], it has been ruled that the question of mental cruelty has to be considered in the light of the norms of marital ties of the particular society to which the parties belong, their social values, status and environment in which they live. If from the conduct of the spouse, it is established and/or an inference can legitimately be drawn that the treatment of the spouse is such that it causes an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse about his or her mental welfare, then the same would amount to cruelty. While dealing with the concept of mental cruelty, enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment and the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse. It has to be seen whether the conduct is such that no reasonable person would tolerate it.

24. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit[10], it has been ruled that as to what constitutes mental cruelty for the purposes of Section 13(1)(ia) will not depend upon the numerical count of such incident or only on the continuous course of such conduct but one has to really go by the intensity, gravity and stigmatic impact of it when meted out even once and the deleterious effect of it on the mental attitude necessary for maintaining a conducive matrimonial home.

25. In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh[11], this Court, after surveying the previous decisions and referring to the concept of cruelty, which includes mental cruelty, in English, American, Canadian and Australian cases, has observed that the human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly, human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in the other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious belief, human values and their value system. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system, etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any straitjacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances.

26. In Suman Kapur v. Sudhir Kapur[12], after referring to various decisions in the field, this Court took note of the fact that the wife had neglected to carry out the matrimonial obligations and further, during the pendency of the mediation proceeding, had sent a notice to the husband through her advocate alleging that he had another wife in USA whose identity was concealed. The said allegation was based on the fact that in his income-tax return, the husband mentioned the “Social Security Number” of his wife which did not belong to the wife, but to an American lady. The husband offered an explanation that it was merely a typographical error and nothing else. The High Court had observed that taking undue advantage of the error in the “Social Security Number”, the wife had gone to the extent of making serious allegation that the husband had married an American woman whose “Social Security Number” was wrongly typed in the income-tax return of the husband. This fact also weighed with this Court and was treated that the entire conduct of the wife did tantamount to mental cruelty.

27. Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law pertaining to mental cruelty, it is to be scrutinized whether in the case at hand, there has been real mental cruelty or not, but, a significant one, the said scrutiny can only be done if the findings are perverse, unreasonable, against the material record or based on non-consideration of relevant materials. We may note here that the High Court has, in a singular line, declined to interfere with the judgment and decree of the courts below stating that they are based on concurrent findings of fact. The plea of perversity of approach though raised was not adverted to.

28. It is worth noting that this Court, in Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by L.Rs. and others[13], has held that while it is true that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. An issue pertaining to perversity comes within the ambit of substantial question of law. Similar view has been stated in Govindaraju v. Mariamman[14].

29. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh (Dead) by LRs and others[15], it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

30. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another[16], it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board & Ors. [17].

31. Having stated the law relating to mental cruelty and the dictum of this Court in respect of the jurisdiction of the High Court where concurrent findings of fact are assailed, as advised at present, we will scan the evidence whether the High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it despite the plea of perversity being raised. Any finding which is not supported by evidence or inferences is drawn in a stretched and unacceptable manner can be said to be perverse. This Court in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution can interfere with concurrent findings of fact, if the conclusions recorded by the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupported by the evidence on record. It has been so held in Alamelu and another v. State, Represented by Inspector of Police[18] and Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.[19]

32. Presently, to the core issue, viz, whether the appellant-husband had made out a case for mental cruelty to entitle him to get a decree for divorce. At this juncture, we may unhesitantly state that the trial court as well as the first appellate court have disbelieved the evidence of most of the witnesses cited on behalf of the husband on the ground that they are interested witnesses. In a matrimonial dispute, it would be inappropriate to expect outsiders to come and depose. The family members and sometimes the relatives, friends and neighbours are the most natural witnesses. The veracity of the testimony is to be tested on objective parameters and not to be thrown overboard on the ground that the witnesses are related to either of the spouse. Exception has been taken by the courts below that the servants of the house should have been examined and that amounts to suppression of the best possible evidence. That apart, the allegations made in the written statement, the dismissal of the case instituted by the wife under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, the non-judging of the material regard being had to the social status, the mental make-up, the milieu and the rejection of subsequent events on the count that they are subsequent to the filing of the petition for divorce and also giving flimsy reasons not to place reliance on the same, we are disposed to think, deserve to be tested on the anvil of “perversity of approach”. Quite apart from the above, a significant question that emerges is whether the reasons ascribed by the courts below that the allegations made in the written statement alleging extra marital affair of the appellant-husband with Neeta Gujarathi has been established and, therefore, it would not constitute mental cruelty are perverse and unacceptable or justified on the basis of the evidence brought on record. These are the aspects which need to be scrutinized and appositely delved into.

33. The appellant-husband, examining himself as PW-1, has categorically stated that the wife used to hide the pressed clothes while he was getting ready to go to the factory. Sometimes she used to crumple the ironed clothes and hide the keys of the motorcycle or close the main gate. In the cross-examination, it is clearly stated that the wife was crumpling the ironed clothes, hiding the keys of the motorcycle and locking the gate to trouble him and the said incidents were taking place for a long time. This being the evidence on record, we are at a loss to find that the courts below could record a finding that the appellant used to enjoy the childish and fanciful behaviour of the wife pertaining to the aforesaid aspect. This finding is definitely based on no evidence. Such a conclusion cannot be reached even by inference. If we allow ourselves to say so, even surmises and conjectures would not permit such a finding to be recorded. It is apt to note here that it does not require Solomon’s wisdom to understand the embarrassment and harassment that might have been felt by the husband. The level of disappointment on his part can be well visualised like a moon in a cloudless sky.

34. Now we shall advert to the allegation made in the written statement. The respondent-wife had made the allegation that the husband had an illicit relationship with Neeta Gujarathi. The learned trial Judge has opined that the said allegation having been proved cannot be treated to have caused mental cruelty. He has referred to various authorities of many High Courts. The heart of the matter is whether such an allegation has actually been proven by adducing acceptable evidence. It is worth noting that the respondent had filed a complaint, RCC No. 91/95, under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code against the husband. He was discharged in the said case. The said order has gone unassailed. The learned trial Judge has expressed the view that Neeta Gujarathi was having a relationship with the husband on the basis that though the husband had admitted that she was working in his office yet he had not produced any appointment letter to show that she was appointed as a computer operator. The trial Judge has relied on the evidence of the wife. The wife in her evidence has stated in an extremely bald manner that whenever she had telephoned to the office in the factory, the husband was not there and further that the presence of Neeta Gujarathi was not liked by her in-laws and the elder son Vishal. On a careful reading of the judgment of the trial court, it is demonstrable that it has been persuaded to return such a finding on the basis of the incident that took place on 11.10.1995. It is worth noting that the wife, who examined herself as RW-1, stated in her evidence that Vishal was deposing against her as the appellant had given him a scooter. The learned trial Judge has given immense credence to the version of the social worker who, on the date of the incident, had come to the house of the appellant where a large crowd had gathered and has deposed that she had seen Neeta going and coming out of the house. The evidence of the wife, when studiedly scrutinized, would show that there was more of suspicion than any kind of truth in it. As has been stated earlier, the respondent had made an allegation that her son was influenced by the appellant-husband. The learned trial Judge as well as the appellate court have accepted the same. It is germane to note that Vishal, the elder son, was approximately 16 years of age at the time of examination in court. There is remotely no suggestion to the said witness that when Neeta Gujarati used to go to the house, his grandfather expressed any kind of disapproval. Thus, the whole thing seems to have rested on the incident of 11.10.1995. On that day, as the material on record would show, at 4.00 p.m., the wife arrived at the house of the husband. She has admitted that she wanted to see her father- in-law who was not keeping well. After she went in, her father-in-law got up from the chair and went upstairs. She was not permitted to go upstairs. It is testified by her that her father-in-law came down and slapped her. She has deposed about the gathering of people and publication in the newspapers about the incident. Vishal, PW-5, has stated that the mother had pushed the grandfather from the chair. The truthfulness of the said aspect need not be dwelled upon. The fact remains that the testimony of the wife that the father-in-law did not like the visit of Neeta does not appear to be true. Had it been so, he would not have behaved in the manner as deposed by the wife. That apart, common sense does not give consent to the theory that both, the father of the husband and his son, Vishal, abandoned normal perception of life and acceded to the illicit intimacy with Neeta. It is interesting to note that she has deposed that it was published in the papers that the daughter-in-law was slapped by the father- in-law and Neeta Gujarathi was recovered from the house but eventually the police lodged a case against the husband, the father-in-law and other relatives under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. We really fail to fathom how from this incident and some cryptic evidence on record, it can be concluded that the respondent-wife had established that the husband had an extra marital relationship with Neeta Gujarathi. That apart, in the application for grant of interim maintenance, she had pleaded that the husband was a womaniser and drunkard. This pleading was wholly unwarranted and, in fact, amounts to a deliberate assault on the character. Thus, we have no scintilla of doubt that the uncalled for allegations are bound to create mental agony and anguish in the mind of the husband.

35. Another aspect needs to be taken note of. She had made allegation about the demand of dowry. RCC No. 133/95 was instituted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the husband, father-in-law and other relatives. They have been acquitted in that case. The said decision of acquittal has not been assailed before the higher forum. Hence, the allegation on this count was incorrect and untruthful and it can unhesitatingly be stated that such an act creates mental trauma in the mind of the husband as no one would like to face a criminal proceeding of this nature on baseless and untruthful allegations.

36. Presently to the subsequent events. The courts below have opined that the publication of notice in the daily “Lokmat” and the occurrence that took place on 11.10.1995 could not be considered as the said events occurred after filing of the petition for divorce. Thereafter, the courts below have proceeded to deal with the effect of the said events on the assumption that they can be taken into consideration. As far as the first incident is concerned, a view has been expressed that the notice was published by the wife to safeguard the interests of the children, and the second one was a reaction on the part of the wife relating to the relationship of the husband with Neeta Gujrathi. We have already referred to the second incident and expressed the view that the said incident does not establish that there was an extra marital relationship between Neeta and the appellant. We have referred to the said incident as we are of the considered opinion that the subsequent events can be taken into consideration. In this context, we may profitably refer to the observations made by a three-Judge Bench in the case of A. Jayachandra (supra) :-

“The matter can be looked at from another angle. If acts subsequent to the filing of the divorce petition can be looked into to infer condonation of the aberrations, acts subsequent to the filing of the petition can be taken note of to show a pattern in the behaviour and conduct.”

37. We may also usefully refer to the observations made in Suman Kapur (supra) wherein the wife had made a maladroit effort to take advantage of a typographical error in the written statement and issued a notice to the husband alleging that he had another wife in USA. Thus, this Court has expressed the opinion that the subsequent events can be considered.

38. Keeping in view the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we shall first appreciate the impact of the notice published in the “Lokmat”. The relevant part of the said notice, as published in the newspaper, reads as follows: –

“Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal is having vices of womanizing, drinking liquor and other bad habits. He is having monthly income of Rs.10 lacs, but due to several vices, he is short of fund. Therefore, he has started selling the property. He has sold some properties. My client has tried to make him understand which is of no use and on the contrary, he has beaten my client very badly and has driven her away and dropped her to Akola at her parent’s house.

In the property of Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal my client and her two sons are having shares in the capacity of members of joint family and Shri Vishwanath Sitaram Agrawal has no right to dispose of the property on any ground.”

Immense emphasis has been given on the fact that after publication of the notice, the husband had filed a caveat in the court. The factual matrix would reveal that the husband comes from a respectable family engaged in business. At the time of publication of the notice, the sons were quite grown up. The respondent-wife did not bother to think what impact it would have on the reputation of the husband and what mental discomfort it would cause. It is manifest from the material on record that the children were staying with the father. They were studying in the school and the father was taking care of everything. Such a publication in the newspaper having good circulation can cause trauma, agony and anguish in the mind of any reasonable man. The explanation given by the wife to the effect that she wanted to protect the interests of the children, as we perceive, is absolutely incredible and implausible. The filing of a caveat is wholly inconsequential. In fact, it can decidedly be said that it was mala fide and the motive was to demolish the reputation of the husband in the society by naming him as a womaniser, drunkard and a man of bad habits.

39. At this stage, we may fruitfully reminisce a poignant passage from N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane[20] wherein Chandrachud, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed thus: –

“The court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and an ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a near-ideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them overlook or gloss over mutual faults and failures.”

40. Regard being had to the aforesaid, we have to evaluate the instances. In our considered opinion, a normal reasonable man is bound to feel the sting and the pungency. The conduct and circumstances make it graphically clear that the respondent-wife had really humiliated him and caused mental cruelty. Her conduct clearly exposits that it has resulted in causing agony and anguish in the mind of the husband. She had publicised in the newspapers that he was a womaniser and a drunkard. She had made wild allegations about his character. She had made an effort to prosecute him in criminal litigations which she had failed to prove. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, agony and frustration of the husband is obvious. It can be stated with certitude that the cumulative effect of the evidence brought on record clearly establish a sustained attitude of causing humiliation and calculated torture on the part of the wife to make the life of the husband miserable. The husband felt humiliated both in private and public life. Indubitably, it created a dent in his reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life. It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as for the posterity. Thus analysed, it would not be out of place to state that his brain and the bones must have felt the chill of humiliation. The dreams sweetly grafted with sanguine fondness with the passage of time reached the Everstine disaster, possibly, with a vow not to melt. The cathartic effect looked like a distant mirage. The cruel behaviour of the wife has frozen the emotions and snuffed out the bright candle of feeling of the husband because he has been treated as an unperson. Thus, analysed, it is abundantly clear that with this mental pain, agony and suffering, the husband cannot be asked to put up with the conduct of the wife and to continue to live with her. Therefore, he is entitled to a decree for divorce.

41. Presently, we shall deal with the aspect pertaining to the grant of permanent alimony. The court of first instance has rejected the application filed by the respondent-wife as no decree for divorce was granted and there was no severance of marital status. We refrain from commenting on the said view as we have opined that the husband is entitled to a decree for divorce. Permanent alimony is to be granted taking into consideration the social status, the conduct of the parties, the way of living of the spouse and such other ancillary aspects. During the course of hearing of the matter, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties on this aspect. After taking instructions from the respective parties, they have addressed us. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that till 21.2.2012, an amount of Rs.17,60,000/- has been paid towards maintenance to the wife as directed by the courts below and hence, that should be deducted from the amount to be fixed. He has further submitted that the permanent alimony should be fixed at Rs.25 lacs. The learned counsel for the respondent, while insisting for affirmance of the decisions of the High Court as well as by the courts below, has submitted that the amount that has already been paid should not be taken into consideration as the same has been paid within a span of number of years and the deduction would affect the future sustenance. He has emphasised on the income of the husband, the progress in the business, the inflation in the cost of living and the way of life the respondent is expected to lead. He has also canvassed that the age factor and the medical aid and assistance that are likely to be needed should be considered and the permanent alimony should be fixed at Rs.75 lacs.

42. In our considered opinion, the amount that has already been paid to the respondent-wife towards alimony is to be ignored as the same had been paid by virtue of the interim orders passed by the courts. It is not expected that the respondent-wife has sustained herself without spending the said money. Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the social strata from which the parties come from and regard being had to the business prospects of the appellant, permanent alimony of Rs.50 lacs (rupees fifty lacs only) should be fixed and, accordingly, we so do. The said amount of Rs.50 lacs (rupees fifty lacs only) shall be deposited by way of bank draft before the trial court within a period of four months and the same shall be handed over to the respondent-wife on proper identification.

43. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and a decree for divorce in favour of the appellant is granted. Further, the husband shall pay Rs.50 lacs (rupees fifty lacs only) towards permanent alimony to the wife in the manner as directed hereinabove. The parties shall bear their respective costs.

……………………………………..J.

[Deepak Verma]

……………………………………..J.

[Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;

 

Sourcess: with Thanks to :http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/180502059/

 

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